Domestic Relations – Court lacks jurisdiction to annul marriage of decedent

Where the administrator of an estate moved to annul a marriage on the basis the decedent lacked the mental capacity to consent to marriage, her suit was dismissed.  Because the marriage was merely voidable, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the annulment suit after death.

Background

Carol Wood Lantz was diagnosed with senile dementia in 2018. In 2021, Virginia W. Bozarth moved in with her sister and became Lantz’s full-time caregiver. Lantz was unable to drive, so Billy Gene Shelton Sr., a long-time family friend, often drove Lantz to run errands. During one such outing in January 2023, Lantz and Shelton had a marriage ceremony and obtained a marriage certificate.

After the marriage ceremony, Lantz continued to live with Bozarth. Lantz’s health deteriorated, and she eventually entered hospice care. When Lantz died in 2024, Bozarth qualified as the administrator of her estate. Bozarth sued to annul Lantz and Shelton’s marriage, asserting that Lantz lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage when it was solemnized.

The circuit court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to annul the marriage after Lantz’s death and that Bozarth lacked standing to impeach the validity of Lantz’s marriage in an annulment action.

Analysis

Virginia Code § 20-45.1(B) provides that marriages involving a party lacking the mental capacity to consent to the marriage when it is solemnized “shall be void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree of divorce or nullity.” Bozarth argues that marriages that contravene Code § 20-45.1(B) are void ab initio, rather than voidable. She contends that Lantz never ratified her marriage to Shelton because of her mental incapacity.

Long-settled precedent holds to the contrary. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court interpreted a predecessor statute to Code § 20-45.1(B), which declared marriages involving an “insane” party to “be void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree of divorce or nullity.” The Court held that the statute rendered such marriages “voidable and not void.”

Code § 20-45.1(B) uses the same operative language: it provides that marriages of mentally incapacitated persons are “void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree of divorce or nullity.” The legislature’s recodification of the language in Cornwall, which has remained binding precedent for nearly 100 years, demonstrates its intent that such marriages are “voidable and not void.”

Additionally, it is well-established that declaring an act void ab initio is “a remedy the General Assembly usually makes quite clear when it intends the courts to award it.” For example, bigamous marriages are “absolutely void.” Similarly, Code § 20-45.1(A) declares bigamous and incestuous marriages “void,” without reference to an annulment or divorce.

The additional requirement in § 20-45.1(B) that a marriage be declared void “by a decree of divorce or nullity” demonstrates that marriages of mentally incapacitated individuals are not void ab initio. If the legislature had intended a marriage by a mentally incapacitated person to be “absolutely” void, it would have said so—just as it has for bigamous and incestuous marriages.

Resisting this conclusion, Bozarth correctly asserts that Code § 20-13 requires all marriages in Virginia to be “under a license and solemnized.” She argues that the marriage between Lantz and Shelton was never solemnized because Lantz “did not have the mental capacity to express” her sincere intent to marry.

But Code § 20-13 is satisfied “[a]s long as . . . consent to be married is presently expressed to and, at the same time, received by the officiant when the celebrants possess a marriage license.” Here, Bozarth does not dispute that a marriage ceremony occurred or that Lantz expressed her consent to the marriage. She argues instead that Lantz lacked the mental capacity to appreciate her expression of intent.

This ground, even if true, would not render the marriage void ab initio: under the plain language of the Code, a marriage between parties who “lacked capacity to consent to the marriage at the time the marriage was solemnized” is merely voidable. Having determined Lantz’s alleged mental incapacity made the marriage merely voidable, the circuit court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the annulment suit after Lantz’s death.

Affirmed.

Bozarth v. Shelton Sr., Record No. 0061-25-2, April 21, 2026. CAV (Ortiz). From the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (Pemberton). Spencer C. Patterson (W. Joseph Owen, III; Owen & Owens PLC, on brief), for appellant. VLW 026-7-150. 10 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-150
Virginia Lawyers Weekly