Civil Rights – Officer denied immunity in fatal shooting case

Where an officer who fatally shot a high-school senior claimed qualified immunity, but his use of deadly force wasn’t justified, and it was clearly established that officers may not use deadly force against an armed suspect unless “based on a reasonable assessment, the officer or another person is *threatened *with the weapon,” which was not the case here, the officer was denied qualified immunity.

Background

Officer Kevin Davis was patrolling a neighborhood under curfew due to the COVID-19 pandemic when he encountered J.R., a high school senior, on the sidewalk. As Davis approached, J.R. took off running. Davis followed. The chase turned deadly when J.R. ignored several commands and Davis noticed that he was armed. Davis fired his weapon at J.R. multiple times, ultimately killing him.

J.R.’s mother sued Davis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant here, she alleges that Davis’s use of deadly force violated J.R.’s Fourth Amendment rights. Although Davis asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity, the district court disagreed.

Clearly established

Starting first with whether Davis violated J.R.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force, the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to use deadly force only if the officer has “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” To determine whether probable cause existed, the court considers (1) “the severity of the crime”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.”

The first factor favors J.R. “Davis was investigating reports of teenagers riding bikes and looking into cars.” That investigation doesn’t suggest a crime, let alone a serious one. The third factor weighs in Davis’s favor. It’s undisputed that J.R. ignored Davis’s commands to “stop running,” “show me your hands” and “get on the ground.”

So this court turns to the second and “most important” factor. Davis claims that he acted reasonably because he “objectively perceived an immediate danger when J.R. failed to follow his clear commands, was visibly holding a handgun firmly in his control, crouched down and turned his head towards Officer Davis.” This court is not persuaded. The district court found any “evidence concerning J.R.’s movements” at this point “ambiguous.” To the extent Davis challenges that factual finding, this court lacks jurisdiction.

Even so, the moment that J.R. was crouched isn’t the one that “matters most.” That’s because any justification Davis might have had for using deadly force when J.R. crouched dissipated when J.R. turned away from Davis and ran. Even considering that J.R. crouched briefly before he ran again, ignored Davis’s commands and was armed, a jury could still find that Davis acted unreasonably.

True, an officer need not “wait until a gun is pointed at him” before using deadly force. But “the officer or another person [must still be] *threatened *with the weapon.” And here, it’s disputed that J.R. made a “furtive or other threatening movement with the weapon that would have signaled an intent to use it in a way that imminently threaten[ed] the safety of [Davis] or another person” at any point during the chase.

The only undisputed movement J.R. made was “turn[ing] [his head] to face Davis in the final moments of the chase, as shown by the impact of Davis’s round.” But viewing that fact in plaintiff’s favor, as required, that isn’t a “movement[] that could reasonably be perceived as dangerous.” So under the totality of the circumstances, Davis’s use of deadly force wasn’t justified and violated J.R.’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Clearly established

Since a 2013 decision, this court has repeatedly warned officers that it’s not objectively reasonable to use deadly force against an armed suspect unless “based on a reasonable assessment, the officer or another person is *threatened *with the weapon.” So when Davis shot and killed J.R. in April 2020, it was “clearly establish[ed] that the failure to obey commands by a person in possession of . . . a weapon only justifies the use of deadly force if that person makes some sort of furtive or other threatening movement with the weapon.”

Affirmed.

Ruffin v. Davis, Case No. 25-1318, April 29, 2026. 4th Cir. (Diaz), from DSC at Columbia (Lydon). John S. Nichols for Appellant. Mary H. Schnoor for Appellee. VLW 026-2-152. 12 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-152
Virginia Lawyers Weekly