Negligence – High-school athlete’s suit against coach and AD is reinstated

Where the circuit court held a high-school soccer player assumed the risk of a heat injury and was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, it erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. There were disputed issues of material fact, including whether the defendants’ conduct created risks the athlete did not know about or could not fully appreciate and whether he was contributorily negligent.

Background                              

Patrick Clancy alleges that during a high-school soccer conditioning session, he sustained an exertional heat injury due to the gross negligence of the school athletic director (Matthew Pearman) and coach (Stuart Pierson). Clancy appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against him based on rulings that he assumed the risk of injury and was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Clancy also claims that the trial court erred by ruling that testimony from his expert witness is inadmissible on the ground that the witness is not a medical doctor.

Assumption of risk

The record supports Clancy’s objection to the grant of summary judgment. The assumption-of-the-risk defense does not apply where the defendants’ negligence creates risks that the plaintiff is not aware of and that are beyond the risks ordinarily expected from participating in the activity. The trial court’s ruling does not address Clancy’s central claim that Pearman and Pierson’s alleged gross negligence exacerbated the risk of heat-related illness beyond that inherent in participating in an outdoor soccer conditioning session during a heat wave.

Based on the record here, disputed questions of fact remained for a jury to decide to determine whether the conduct of Pearman and Pierson created risks that Clancy did not know about or could not fully appreciate. Reasonable minds could disagree about whether Clancy assumed the risk of heat-related illness by participating in the allegedly voluntary conditioning session under the supervision of Pearman and Pierson. Consequently, the trial court erred by relying on this ground as a basis for granting the extreme remedy of summary judgment.

Contributory negligence

The trial court ruled that Clancy “contributed to his own injuries by not taking the necessary actions to protect himself.” The court based this ruling on the fact that Clancy did not alert anyone that he was feeling unwell. It reasoned that “at some point” student athletes “have to say, I am not feeling well, I’m feeling sick.”

Clancy contends that the evidence did not prove he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and, further, that the trial court’s finding of contributory negligence “[wa]s really an argument for reduction of damages.” He asserts that material facts remain in dispute and should be decided by a jury. This court agrees.

A jury could find that the issue of whether Clancy acted reasonably once he started to feel unwell was one of failure to mitigate damages rather than contributory negligence. If the jury were to find that Pearman and Pierson were grossly negligent for holding the session outside in the heat and that Clancy was not at fault for deciding to attend the conditioning session in the first place but was at fault for not resting when he began to feel ill, the jury might properly conclude, at most, that Clancy failed to mitigate his damages.

Whether Clancy was contributorily negligent or failed to mitigate his damages involves factual determinations that the parties dispute and, accordingly, should be resolved by a jury at trial. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Pearman and Pierson on the ground that Clancy assumed the risk of exertional heat injury or was contributorily negligent in sustaining that injury.

Expert

Clancy challenges the trial court’s ruling excluding a portion of Dr. Casa’s proffered testimony on the ground that Casa is not a medical doctor. He suggests that Casa, an athletic trainer, was qualified to testify about “the prevention, recognition, evaluation, and treatment of heat-related injuries” caused by a soccer conditioning session. This court disagrees. He is not a medical doctor, the statutory definition of athletic trainer does not qualify him to testify about the prevention, recognition, evaluation or treatment of injuries or conditions, and no explicit statutory exception allows for such testimony.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Clancy v. Pearman, Record No. 0383-25-2, April 21, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Decker). From the Circuit Court of Albemarle County (Higgins). J. Lloyd Snook, III (Snook & Haughey, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Melissa Y. York (Jennifer D. Royer; Royer Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellees. VLW 026-7-157. 18 pp.