No damages after rejection of equivalent position

Where a pilot returning from military leave was offered an equivalent position, albeit in a different city, and implementing regulations by the Department of Labor, or DOL, specify that a reemployment position may involve transfer to another location, but the pilot refused the transfer, the district court did not err in concluding the pilot was not entitled to pay damages after this date.

Background

Thomas Harwood alleged American Airlines violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act or USERRA, by delaying his reemployment and denying him a pilot position after a qualifying period of military leave from June 2013 to August 2015.

The record shows that on Oct. 22, 2015, American Airlines extended two options to Harwood. First, American Airlines offered to extend his military leave, giving him time to seek the necessary FAA medical clearance with “reasonable assistance” from American Airlines. Alternatively, American Airlines offered to “reemploy him in the Flight Technical Operations Group at the Flight Academy in [Dallas-Fort Worth], in a position appropriate for his status.” Harwood declined both options but served several more terms of military duty during the following months.

Harwood ultimately agreed to accept the position in Fort Worth with a start date of Jan. 25, 2016. However, on January 25, 2016, the FAA finally granted his medical certificate. Harwood informed American Airlines and they reinstated him as a pilot the next day.

The district court granted summary judgment to Harwood, reasoning that under § 4312, Harwood should have been reemployed on Sept. 1 and that American Airlines’ failure to do so also violated § 4313. This court affirmed the district court’s holdings as to liability under USERRA but remanded for a recalculation of damages because American Airlines should not have been held responsible for the period between Harwood’s rejection of the offered position and acceptance “unless the offered position was not equivalent under [USERRA].”

On remand, the district court found that American Airlines offered Harwood an equivalent position on Oct. 22 and reduced his back pay to $28,771.41, the amount due for the period from Sept. 1—when Harwood should have been reemployed—up to when American Airlines offered him the equivalent position. It awarded Harwood fees and costs of $87,267.86.

Equivalence

The sole factual determination was whether the position American Airlines offered to Harwood on Oct. 22 was equivalent to his escalator position as a line pilot. Harwood contends that the legislative history of USERRA supports his argument that “[a] reinstatement offer in another city is particularly violative of like status, as would be reinstatement in a position which does not allow for the use of specialized skills in a unique situation.” However, implementing regulations promulgated by the DOL specify that “[t]he reemployment position may involve transfer to another … location ….” Further, the district court’s reasoning, citing this DOL guidance, indicates that it did in fact take the location change and Harwood’s indicated willingness to accept a position in Dallas into account as part of a totality of the circumstances analysis.

Harwood argues that American Airlines’ offer of reemployment was vague, in that it only stated that the position was appropriate for his status and would be compensated at the same rate as he would be as a pilot but failed to outline specific benefits such as those that were negotiated under the collective bargaining agreement. But USERRA does not have a specificity requirement and, more notably, neither Harwood nor his counsel sought further specifics about the position before rejecting it.

Harwood’s other arguments are unpersuasive as they do not pertain to the narrow instructions issued to the district court and, further, read in obligations well beyond those imposed by the language of USERRA itself. Finding no other abuse of discretion in its calculation of the appropriate amount of damages, the district court’s damages award is affirmed.

Fees and costs

The district court’s total award of $77,097.92 in attorneys’ fees does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court employed the proper methodology: It calculated the lodestar by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, appropriately considering the relevant factors. Then it reduced the fee award for lack of success and impermissible billing.

Harwood argues that district courts should not be permitted to make across-the-board reductions and should instead make targeted reductions to directly address specific issues. Case law places no such burden on the trial court. Harwood’s remaining arguments take issue with the particulars of the district court’s awards, but these arguments fall within the heartland of district courts’ broad discretion and cannot prevail.

Affirmed.

Harwood v. American Airlines Inc., Case Nos. 20-2200, 21-1137, June 17, 2022. 4th Cir. (Floyd), from EDVA at Alexandria (O’Grady). Adam Augustine Carter for Appellant. Jason Matthew Zarrow for Appellee. VLW 022-2-149. 15 pp.