No qualified immunity in alleged false confession suit

Where the district court held that an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a man’s false and coerced confession claim, it did not err. Qualified immunity here turned on a question of fact.

Background

Kewon English and Earl Powell were arrested for sexual assault and burglary and detained for over a year before their cases were nolle prossed and they were released. They filed suit, alleging that the investigator who interrogated them in connection with the charges, Joseph Clarke of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, had coerced them into signing false confessions. That coercion, and the arrests and imprisonments that followed it, they argued, violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sued Clarke, Sheriff Leon Lott and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department for damages under § 1983.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion on all of English’s claims and on all of Powell’s claims except for a malicious prosecution claim against Clarke. Powell’s malicious prosecution claim, the district court said, could proceed to trial because it turned on a disputed question of fact—namely, whether the confessions were indeed coerced. English has appealed the grant of summary judgment as to his claims, and Clarke has cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment as to Powell’s remaining claim.

English

English argues that the district court erred when it granted the defendants summary judgment as to his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court disagrees.

Clarke is entitled to summary judgment on English’s Fourth Amendment claims because there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute English based on the victim’s identifications. English’s other claims against Clarke fare no better. His First Amendment claim is unsupported by the law, and his Fourteenth Amendment claims are unsupported by the record. Given that English has not made out a constitutional claim against Clarke, the alleged perpetrator here, there is no issue of triable fact as to liability for Sheriff Lott or the department.

Clarke

Clarke filed this interlocutory cross-appeal, arguing that the district court wrongly denied him qualified immunity when it let the claim go forward. Powell, in response, moved to dismiss the cross-appeal, arguing that qualified immunity here turns on a question of fact and is thus not eligible for interlocutory appeal. The court agrees with Powell.

The appeal here is heavily factual and unsuitable for interlocutory treatment. The evidence against Powell was considerably thinner than the evidence against English. The victim offered nothing remotely akin to the consistent identifications she offered with respect to English. Apart from the confessions, the only evidence connecting Powell to the crimes was that he was with English the night before. That does not satisfy probable cause.

While Clarke argues that confessions, even if coerced, can bolster the case for probable cause, the district court held that infirm confessions should not be included in the probable cause calculus. This court is not in any position to sort out the facts and determine whether the confessions are infirm or not. The facts surrounding the confessions are very much in dispute, reinforcing the inappropriateness of accepting this cross-appeal for interlocutory treatment.

Appeal No. 22-1788 affirmed. Appeal. No. 22-1817 dismissed.

English v. Clarke, Case Nos. 22-1788, 22-1817, Jan. 5, 2024. 4th Cir. (Wilkinson), from DSC at Columbia (Childs). James Andrew Bradshaw Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Andrew Lindemann for Appellees/Cross- Appellants. VLW 024-2-010. 23 pp.