Retaliation claim against prison officials reinstated

Where prison officials allegedly transferred an inmate to another facility in retaliation for his filing of grievances, and the officials allegedly made statements that the transfer was intended to be punitive, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officials on the retaliation claim.

Background

Jordan Jones appeals from the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the various defendants in this prisoner § 1983 case, in which Jones challenged the conditions of his confinement and an allegedly retaliatory transfer to another prison.

Qualified immunity

“To overcome an official’s claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Here, even assuming defendants violated Jones’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, they are entitled to qualified immunity under the clearly established prong.

This court has not located any other Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court case that would have alerted a reasonable correctional officer that, in the specific facts of this case — which include a relatively short duration, access to toilet paper, an otherwise clean cell, the removal of the waste from the cell after each bowel movement, access to other necessities like a blanket and the lack of any evidence of underlying medical conditions making Jones more susceptible to illness — depriving Jones of the means to clean his hands, arms and clothing for about a day exposed him to a substantial risk of serious physical harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, there is no “robust consensus of persuasive authority” showing that Jones’s rights were violated. In cases involving less extreme situations, other circuit courts have declined to find Eighth Amendment violations.

Retaliation

Jones also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on his retaliation claim. Jones alleges that defendants transferred him from Avery-Mitchell to Lanesboro in retaliation for his filing of grievances.

Defendants contend that the evidence shows that they would have made the same decision to transfer Jones with or without his protected conduct. But in support, defendants have pointed only to their own general assertions that Jones was transferred for permissible reasons. That is not enough to meet their burden under the same-decision test, at least not at the summary-judgment stage.

Having concluded that the first and third prongs of the retaliation analysis are satisfied as to Taylor, the court turns to the primary issue on appeal: whether the transfer can constitute an adverse action that satisfies the second prong of the retaliation analysis.

Prison officials certainly have broad latitude to relocate prisoners as needed for the purposes of prison administration and safety. But they may not violate the First Amendment by transferring a prisoner in retaliation for protected conduct. Additionally, a transfer or placement in a more restrictive or dangerous setting can constitute an adverse action.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, the facts in this case support the conclusion that the transfer was an adverse action. The evidence indicates that Lanesboro was, at minimum, perceived by inmates to be more dangerous than Avery-Mitchell. And Lanesboro posed a particular danger for Jones: another prisoner who had previously assaulted him was housed there.

The transfer also automatically disenrolled Jones from a computer-applications class he was taking at Avery-Mitchell. Moreover, the court can infer from the prison officials’ statements that Jones’s transfer was intended to be punitive. The court has little trouble concluding that the combined effect of these aspects of the transfer “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.”

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The court disagrees. This court has held that the “First Amendment right to be free from retaliation by prison officials for filing a grievance was clearly established in 2010.”

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Concurring opinion

King, J., concurring in the judgment:

My friends in the majority have properly determined that Jones’s dry cell treatment — as revealed by this record — was “gross, degrading, and deeply concerning.” Their fine opinion, however, does not answer the important question of whether such treatment contravenes the Eighth Amendment. I would conclude that it did.

I nevertheless agree with my good colleagues that an award of qualified immunity is appropriate with respect to Jones’s Eighth Amendment claim. When the constitutional violation that I would recognize occurred, the law of our Circuit did not clearly establish the scope of Jones’s constitutional right to basic elements of hygiene.

Jones v. Solomon, Case No. 21-7239, Jan. 3, 2024. 4th Cir. (Wynn), from WDNC at Asheville (Reidinger). Harry S. Graver for Appellant. Orlando Luis Rodriguez for Appellees. VLW 024-2-004. 31 pp.