Employment: Hostile work environment claim is untimely

Where an employee failed to allege an act that contributed to the hostile work environment that was committed within 300 days before the date she filed her charge of discrimination, her hostile work environment claim was dismissed as untimely.

Background

Lisa Bowman alleges that a United Way Worldwide employee (William Browning) subjected her to a hostile work environment because of her gender and that the company subsequently retaliated against her for complaining of the harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the hostile work environment count on the basis it is time barred.

Analysis

Title VII requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice if the claimant initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency. In the hostile work environment context, however, courts generally follow the “continuing violation doctrine,” which provides that if acts outside the statutory window contribute to a hostile work environment, the court may consider all of those acts, so long as any act contributing to that same hostile work environment occurs within the statutory window.

Importantly, however, “incidents can only qualify as a part of the same hostile work environment claim if they are adequately linked—that is, if the incidents involve the same type of employment actions, occur relatively frequently, and are perpetrated by the same managers.”

Here, plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on March 17, 2020. Thus, she needed to allege that an anchoring act contributing to her hostile work environment claim occurred on or after May 22, 2019 – 300 days before March 17, 2020. Defendant asserts that the latest plaintiff alleges that “she was subjected to sexually harassing conduct was on February 26, 2019,” which is 85 days prior to May 22, 2019, making Count One untimely. Plaintiff contends that she alleges that an anchoring act occurred on Oct. 16, 2019, which is within the 300-day statutory period.

The Oct. 16, 2019, call that plaintiff asserts is an anchoring event for her hostile work environment claim does not appear in the harassment section of the complaint, but rather in the subsequent section titled “Retaliation After Ms. Bowman’s Complaints.” Given the strain in plaintiff and Browning’s work relationship, that plaintiff called Browning to resolve work-related issues and that the call occurred eight months after the last alleged incident of gender-based harassment, it is unclear whether the Oct. 16, 2019, call is sufficiently linked to the alleged prior incidents of gender-based discrimination to qualify as part of the same hostile work environment claim.

The general allegation that Browning became “passive-aggressive and started bullying” plaintiff during the Oct. 16 call “by yelling at her, dismissing her concerns, and insulting her,” without further details as to the substance of Browning’s communications, leaves the court with insufficient information to conclude that Browning’s response was due to her gender rather than the work issues to which she refers in the complaint.

Plaintiff argues, however, that the allegations describing Browning as acting “in an intimidating, disruptive, obtrusive, passive aggressive, and bullying manner” suggest that his behavior “appears to be motivated by a general hostility toward women.” This court disagrees. Absent more specific allegations demonstrating how Browning’s conduct during the call exhibited hostility toward plaintiff’s gender, Browning’s conduct is more appropriately characterized as “rude treatment,” “callous behavior” or a “routine difference of opinion and personality conflict,” which the Fourth Circuit has held does not constitute actionable discrimination under Title VII.

Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss granted.

Browning v. United Way Worldwide, Case No. 1:24-cv-885, Jan. 8, 2025. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 025-3-008. 13 pp.