Employment: McDonalds dismissed from race discrimination/retaliation suit

Where a former employee at a McDonalds franchisee asserts claims for race discrimination and retaliation, but she failed to plead facts plausibly showing that McDonalds USA LLC could be held responsible under either a joint employer or an actual/apparent agency theory of liability, McDonalds was dismissed from the suit.

Background

Trenessidahsaan Edmonds brings this action against Cullen Management LLC,  Eric Cullen and McDonald’s USA LLC, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Virginia Human Rights Act, or VHRA. The Cullen defendants move for partial dismissal, while McDonald’s seeks dismissal of the entire complaint.

McDonalds

McDonald’s argues that Edmonds has not plausibly alleged it can be held responsible for her claims under either a joint employer or an actual/apparent agency theory of liability. The court agrees.

Edmonds fails to allege non-conclusory facts demonstrating that McDonald’s controls her employment. First, she does not sufficiently plead that McDonald’s had the authority to hire or fire her, apart from the generalized assertion that it oversaw “the disciplining and firing of workers, among other things.” This conclusory statement lacks factual support showing that McDonald’s played any role in hiring or firing decisions at the Pulaski McDonald’s.

Second, Edmonds does not allege facts indicating that McDonald’s exercised direct supervision over her daily work. Mere assertions that McDonald’s established operational policies and brand-wide standards do not suffice. Courts have consistently held that such general oversight is inadequate to establish the level of control necessary for joint employer liability.

Third, Edmonds’ allegations that McDonald’s controlled the Pulaski McDonald’s “physical work environment” lacks specific factual support regarding the furnishing of workplace equipment. Moreover, Edmonds’ specific allegations pertaining to use of McDonald’s mandatory computer systems for employee scheduling and assignments, the issuance of a McDonald’s uniform and the sale of McDonald’s products are likewise overly broad and conclusory.

Ultimately, Edmonds’ allegations describe a standard franchisor-franchisee relationship in which McDonald’s enforces brand consistency through policies, training, and operational guidelines. Such allegations fail to establish that McDonald’s exercised direct control over her workplace conditions sufficient to impose joint employer liability.

In the alternative to her “joint employer” theory of liability, Edmonds argues that McDonald’s is liable under theories of actual or apparent agency. However, control is the defining characteristic of an actual agency relationship. As discussed, Edmonds fails to plead facts demonstrating that McDonald’s exercised control over the daily operations or personnel management at the Pulaski McDonald’s.

Regarding apparent agency, the general allegations that McDonald’s provided standardized policies, training, uniforms and procedures merely reflect the fundamentals of a franchise relationship. Edmonds does not identify any representations by McDonald’s that could have reasonably led her to believe it authorized or endorsed the alleged discrimination and harassment.

Simply put, McDonald’s cannot be held liable just because Edmonds mistakenly believed it was her employer or controlled her workplace conditions consistent to that of any franchisor. Imposing liability on this basis would prevent McDonald’s from asserting a defense available to actual employers, who have the means to prevent or correct workplace harassment.

Race claims

Edmonds pled that the Cullen defendants disparately subjected Black employees to increased work, heightened employment standards and harsher disciplinary actions. Particularly, Edmonds alleges that unlike other Pulaski McDonald’s employees, she and her Black coworker were ordered to leave the premises, and were terminated, for failure to comply with an order to remove their Black Lives Matter face masks. I find that Edmonds pled sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the elements of her racial discrimination causes of action to raise her right to relief above the speculative level.

Edmonds alleges she was terminated after repeatedly reporting racial discrimination and harassment to Cullen and other managers at the Pulaski McDonald’s. She also asserts that she refused to remove her Black Lives Matter mask because she “reasonably believed that the request to remove her mask was racially discriminatory was protected activity.”

Edmonds’ immediate termination following this request plausibly establishes a temporal proximity to her refusal to remove her Black Lives Matter mask. Further, the complaint includes additional allegations that suggest a retaliatory animus to her termination. As such, Edmonds retaliation claim is sufficiently plead to survive the Cullen defendants’ motion to dismiss. However Cullen is not an “employer” under the VHRA, so the VHRA counts against Cullen are dismissed.

McDonalds’ motion to dismiss granted. Cullen defendants’ motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.

Edmonds v. McDonalds USA LLC, Case No. 7:24-cv-00308, Apr. 9, 2025. WDVA at Roanoke (Ballou). VLW 025-3-153. 16 pp.