Employment: Woman sues city of Richmond for race and national origin discrimination

Where the employee pleaded facts making her claims plausible, including that she was transferred after she complained about treatment in the workplace by someone who previously made a racially-charged comment to her, her discrimination and retaliation claims survived the city of Richmond’s motion to dismiss.

Background

Surani Olsen alleges that she has been subjected to discrimination at her place of employment, the City of Richmond, based on her race and national origin. The City has moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, or FAC.

Exhaustion

Plaintiff asserts that, from the outset of her employment with the City, she experienced pay discrimination based on her sex. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or EEOC, charge does not involve any sex-based discrimination. Because these allegations are not “like or related to” those included in the EEOC charge, plaintiff may not rely on them for purposes of the instant action.

Plaintiff first filed a formal EEOC charge against the City on Nove. 22, 2022. Then, on March 27, 2023, plaintiff filed the amended EEOC charge that underlies the instant action. Plaintiff advances a number of allegations that do not directly relate to the events described in the amended EEOC charge, but rather amount to allegations of retaliation for the filing of the EEOC charges themselves. The Fourth Circuit has held that such allegations are not subject to the general administrative exhaustion requirements. Thus, the court will consider the following in relation to plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for filing the EEOC charges.

Discrimination

The City argues that plaintiff did not experience any adverse employment action.  The court disagrees. Plaintiff’s demotion resulted in a “disadvantageous change” to the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment, since it resulted in, among other things, different responsibilities, less supervisory responsibilities and required plaintiff to relocate to the Wastewater Treatment Plant. The demotion decision was partly made by Ms. Bingham, who had previously made a racially-charged comment to plaintiff.

Plaintiff was illogically transferred to a department where she wholly lacked any experience, and, oddly, replaced three times over by individuals outside her protected class without the requisite experience. Finally, the fact that plaintiff was transferred to such an obviously undesirable location such as a Wastewater Treatment Plant, accompanied by the fact that she was assigned to a supervisor with whom she had experienced multiple personal disagreements, create an inference that the specifics of the demotion were chosen out of malice.

Hostile work environment

Plaintiff has adequately alleged that she subjectively perceived the demoted conditions as hostile and abusive. Thus, the determinate question is whether plaintiff has alleged objectively hostile conditions. She has.

First, due to the fact that the purportedly hostile environment was a physical one, the abuse was utterly pervasive for the time that plaintiff was stationed at the Wastewater Treatment Plant: plaintiff experienced the upsetting conditions of the Plant each day she was stationed there, for the entirety of that day. Second, the alleged conditions were physically humiliating and threatening. While plaintiff was stationed at the plant, she was degradingly made to work amongst the stench of sewage and rotten eggs. The building also lacked HVAC, resulting in uncomfortably warm and cold conditions.

Plaintiff’s station also posed a physical hazard to her, since the building may have contained asbestos and had mold along the walls and ceilings. Third, plaintiff has adequately alleged that the conditions in the Wastewater Treatment Plant were objectively psychologically distressing, which both demonstrates an injury to plaintiff’s “psychological well-being.”

Retaliation

The latest of the protected activity occurred on approximately July 14-15, 2022, when plaintiff contacted city employees regarding Ms. Bingham’s comment and conduct. Slightly more than one month later, plaintiff learned she was being demoted. The lapsing of more than one month places this case just outside the bounds of a causal inference based on temporal proximity alone. And that inference is strengthened by the intervening circumstances.

The facts also support an inference of retaliation based upon plaintiff’s EEOC charge. Plaintiff alleges that she interviewed for two other positions within the City, but that Mr. Harrison (her supervisor) admonished plaintiff: “Don’t wipe your butt . . . before you sh**!” and that she was not selected for either position, after an interviewer said they would contact Mr. Harrison.

Punitive damages

As a general matter, courts in Virginia do not permit punitive damages claims to proceed against municipalities. Moreover, Title VII does not authorize punitive damages against governments. As such, the court will grant the City’s motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s punitive damages claims.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.

Olsen v. City of Richmond, Case No. 3:23-cv-475, Sept. 16, 2025. EDVA at Richmond (Young). VLW 025-3-388. 36 pp.