Domestic Relations: Trial court wrongly transferred husband’s debt to wife

Where the trial court required wife to refinance, rather than simply assume, the mortgage on her home that was guaranteed solely by her ex-husband, it erred. The circuit court’s decision had the effect of transferring husband’s debt to wife.

Background

Ruby R. Vaughan appeals the circuit court’s final decree of divorce from Kenneth N. Vaughan Sr. Wife argues that the circuit court erred by not awarding her more in spousal support and by requiring her to refinance a mortgage that was solely in husband’s name.

Refinancing

Wife argues that the circuit court erred by requiring her to refinance, rather than simply assume, the mortgage on her home that was guaranteed solely by husband. She contends that under Code § 20-107.3(C), the circuit court lacked the authority to order refinancing of the debt.

Here, after the parties separated, husband assisted wife in purchasing a home by obtaining the mortgage for the home in his name. The circuit court classified the home “as [wife’s] separate property” but did not classify husband’s mortgage debt.

Nonetheless, it proceeded to transfer that debt to wife, ordering that husband’s “name shall be removed from the mortgage, and [wife] shall refinance the mortgage.” By transferring a debt without first classifying that debt, the circuit court failed to follow “all of the provisions of Code § 20-107.3” that “must be followed.”

And by failing to follow the required provisions of Code § 20-107.3, the circuit court misapplied the equitable distribution statute. Accordingly, this court reverses and remands for the circuit court to make a proper determination of the classification of the mortgage debt and further consider equitable distribution, guided by Code § 20-107.3.2

Spousal support

As part of its equitable distribution of the parties’ property, the circuit court ordered husband to pay wife half the value of his Thrift Savings Plan and half the value of his unused United States Postal Service leave. It also stated that it reached its spousal support award after “consider[ing] all the statutory factors,” including “[wife’s] need, [husband’s] ability to pay, and this [c]ourt’s ruling regarding equitable distribution.”

Thus, the circuit court’s spousal support award was conditioned, in part, on its equitable distribution ruling. “Accordingly, our ruling reversing the equitable distribution award and remanding the case for additional proceedings requires that the circuit court, on remand, also revisit the award of spousal support in order to make any necessary adjustments.”

Reversed and remanded.

Vaughan v. Vaughan Sr., Record No. 0444-24-2, Oct. 7, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Malveaux). From the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (Pemberton). Ruby R. Vaughan, pro se. Kenneth Vaughan, Sr., pro se. VLW 025-7-278. 8 pp.