Criminal – Man convicted of abducting girlfriend

Where the defendant’s girlfriend testified that he refused to allow her to leave their residence and threatened her with a knife, and her testimony was not inherently incredible, his convictions for abduction and obstructing a call for emergency services were affirmed.

Background

Isaiah Tra Hern Chaplin appeals his convictions for abduction and obstructing a call for emergency services in violation of Code §§ 18.2-47 and -164. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

Sufficiency

Chaplin contends that his girlfriend, Courtney Ferguson, was an inherently incredible witness because her “inconsistent knife descriptions” and “false claim of a Walmart assault” rendered her testimony unworthy of belief and incredible as a matter of law. The court disagrees.

Ferguson’s credibility was an issue for the finder of fact to consider when weighing her testimony. Neither Ferguson’s inability to give a detailed description of the knife until it was shown to her nor her recounting of the altercation in Walmart rendered her testimony inherently incredible.

The trial took place more than three years after the incident. The passage of time provided a reasonable explanation for Ferguson’s faded memory of the knife’s appearance. And Ferguson was able to readily identify the knife when she saw it.

Regarding the Walmart incident, there was no legally significant contradictory evidence. Detective Campbell testified that the video footage from Walmart did not depict a physical altercation between Chaplin and Ferguson, but he also could not recall if the footage he reviewed recorded what happened in the produce section where the assault reportedly took place.
To the extent that Ferguson’s testimony contained inconsistencies, they did not as a matter of law “render [her] testimony unworthy of belief.” Instead, the inconsistencies were a circumstance that the trial court “appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness credibility.”

In exercising its role as the finder of fact, “the trial court . . . had the opportunity to listen to the testimony, observe the witnesses, consider the arguments of counsel, and determine what happened.” The court credited Ferguson’s account. This conclusion may not be overturned on appeal because her testimony was not, as a matter of law, “inherently incredible[] or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.”

Elements

A defendant is guilty of abduction if, “by force, intimidation[,] or deception, and without legal justification or excuse, [he] seizes, takes, transports, detains[,] or secretes another person with the intent to deprive such other person of [her] personal liberty.”

Chaplin contends the evidence was not sufficient to support his abduction conviction because the Commonwealth did not prove that (1) he committed an asportation, (2) he intended to deprive Ferguson of her personal liberty and (3) any unlawful detention he used was more than necessary to commit the alleged underlying assault. Chaplin also argues the evidence did not support his conviction for obstructing a call for emergency services because the Commonwealth did not prove that Ferguson attempted to summon law enforcement.

“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” The issue “must be” raised in “both [a] specific and [a] timely” manner, “so that the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.”

Chaplin made no arguments to the trial court about the specific elements of the offenses. He challenged only Ferguson’s credibility. So his additional arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not preserved for appellate review. Anticipating this conclusion, Chaplin asks this court to consider his various new arguments under the ends-of-justice exception contained in Rule 5A:18.

Chaplin contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish essential elements of the offenses of both abduction and obstructing a call for emergency services. These arguments pertain to the degree of proof necessary to sustain his convictions. But as the law makes clear, a failure of proof does not trigger application of the ends-of-justice exception contained in Rule 5A:18. Only when the record affirmatively proves that the challenged element of the offense did not occur does the ends-of-justice exception apply. No such affirmative proof exists here.

Affirmed.

Chaplin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0985-25-3, July 14, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Decker). From the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg (Watson). M. Kevin Bailey (M. Kevin Bailey, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Sandra M. Workman, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Angelique Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-297. 9 pp.

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