Tort: $1 million defamation verdict is vacated

Where a jury awarded $1 million to a man accused of being a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER,” the verdict was vacated. The protected opinions were based upon and derived from fully disclosed facts.

Background

In a Facebook post, William Petrak repeatedly labeled Ryan Sawyers, then-Chairman of the Prince William County School Board, a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER.” He included a comment Sawyers made about a librarian, a screenshot of Sawyers thanking Senator Al Franken on Twitter and a photograph of Franken engaged in inappropriate conduct. The jury returned a verdict finding Petrak liable for defamation and acting with “actual malice,” and awarded Sawyers $1,000,000 in damages.

Opinion

Petrak asserts that his comments constitute protected opinions because they are based upon and derived from fully disclosed facts. This court agrees. Virginia caselaw and the Restatement (Second) of Torts make clear that the First Amendment protects statements of opinion based on disclosed or assumed non-defamatory facts.

First, Petrak’s Facebook post fully discloses the factual predicates underlying his opinions: Sawyers’s Facebook comment calling the librarian “[s]uch a LILF,” his tweet thanking Senator Al Franken and the photograph of Al Franken groping a sleeping woman. Petrak lays out all the facts that form his opinion and the record shows that he relied on no unknown or undisclosed facts.

Petrak’s conclusion is explicitly based on the three disclosed facts, providing readers with the necessary context to evaluate his claims independently. The audience had the requisite information or knowledge of the factual basis for Petrak’s conclusions to determine whether the accusations are perceived as pure opinion based on his subjective analysis.

Second, Petrak’s opinion, drawn from these disclosed facts, cannot support liability in the absence of falsity in the underlying facts. Sawyers acknowledges making the LILF comment, that the images depict Al Franken’s incident and that he thanked Al Franken on Twitter. His testimony about the meaning of “LILF” offers an alternative interpretation.

However, it does not challenge the factual existence of the comment or tweet. Nor does it claim that the underlying facts are defamatory. The dispute, therefore, lies only in Petrak’s interpretation and assessment of the fully disclosed facts, which is non-actionable opinion.

Third, a reader of the Facebook post could reasonably conclude that Petrak’s comments characterizing Sawyers as a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER” constituted his subjective analysis. Petrak guides the reader sequentially through each disclosed fact. He signals the subjective nature of his reasoning with phrases like, “If that isn’t the behavior of a SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER, I don’t know what is.”

Even the more provocative phrase, “Ryan Sawyers is an open serving SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER,” appears within a contextual narrative that ties directly back to the disclosed facts and is introduced by the word “So.” Viewed in isolation, that statement might be interpreted as factual. In context, however, it forms part of a larger narrative expressing Petrak’s personal assessment or interpretation of the disclosed facts.

By presenting the two photographs and then using the word “So,” Petrak appears to be drawing his opinion or inference directly from his perceived connection between the tweet and the pictures. By layering facts and reasoning in a step-by-step manner, as Petrak does throughout his post, he helps the reader understand the basis for his conclusion and reasonably perceive the post as Petrak’s subjective analysis based on the facts he disclosed.

Anti-SLAPP

Virginia’s anti-SLAPP statute grants immunity “from [civil] liability if the . . . claim is based solely on statements . . . regarding matters of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States[.]” If a statement is made with “actual malice,” however, immunity cannot apply.

Because Petrak’s statements are constitutionally protected opinion, the jury finding of actual malice cannot stand. As opinions, they are not “false” within the meaning of Code § 8.01-223.2(B). Additionally, as a matter of law, actual malice cannot be established when the statements convey no provably false or factual meaning, such as pure opinions based on fully disclosed facts. Since Petrak’s expressions of opinion are protected under the First Amendment and both parties agree that these expressions regard matters of public concern, the immunity provided under Code § 8.01-223.2 applies.

The trial court thus erred in denying Petrak’s plea in bar. On remand, the court should determine whether Petrak is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Code § 8.01-223.2(C).

Reversed and remanded.

Petrak v. Sawyers, Record No. 0110-24-4, Oct. 21, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Chaney). From the Circuit Court of Prince William County (Hudson). Lee E. Berlik (R. Jackson Martin; BerlikLaw, LLC, on briefs), for appellant. Evan D. Mayo (Daniel R.O. Long; Tremblay & Smith, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-296. 16 pp.