Employment: Disability claims survive motion to dismiss

Where a maintenance worker alleged he was terminated after he sought an accommodation, and that the reason for his termination was false, his discrimination and retaliation claims survived the company’s motion to dismiss.

Background

Frank Vega’s third amended complaint against Amurcon Realty Company raises four claims: (i) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA; (ii) disability retaliation in violation of the ADA; (iii) wrongful discharge in violation of the ADA and (iv) cat’s paw liability. Amurcon has filed a motion to dismiss.

Disability discrimination

To state a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show: “(1) that [they] have a disability, (2) that [they are] a qualified individual for the employment in question, and (3) that [the employer] discharged [them] (or took other adverse employment action) because of [their] disability.” The court considers elements two and three.

Vega alleges he “was able to perform the essential functions of the job in question . . . with or without an accommodation,” and that he received “two (2) excellent work ratings” while employed. Amurcon’s motion to dismiss fails to argue that Vega’s alleged facts are insufficient to establish that he is a qualified individual. Therefore Vega has alleged sufficient facts to establish this element.

Turning to the fourth element, after Vega’s termination, Amurcon’s office manager insisted on two separate occasions that Vega was terminated because “the company was going over their budget” and that Amurcon did not “have any issues with [Vega’s] work. However, Amurcon immediately replaced Vega with a different employee, showing that this reason was not truthful. Even further, Amurcon’s office manager later “apologize[d] for lying to [Vega]” and admitted that the company terminated him for “doing too much talking and not enough work.”

These changing reasons, as well as the evidence of a new hire hint that Vega’s disability played “a motivating role” in Amurcon’s decision. Vega thus alleges sufficient facts to survive dismissal on Count One.

Count Two

Amurcon argues Vega’s retaliation claim fails as he did not “engage in protected activity by using his accommodation” and does not “bridge the causation gap.” The court disagrees.

Upon being hired, Vega “informed Mr. Barnes of his . . . lower back surgery . . . and his disability related restrictions of a thirty-five (35) pound lifting limit, (sic) and bending.” Although Vega did not explicitly seek a reasonable accommodation, he asked for “job restructuring” and “modified” set of responsibilities; therefore, his conversation with Barnes qualifies as an ADA reasonable accommodation request.

Courts find facts sufficient to allege causation through temporal proximity when very little time passes between the protected activity and the adverse action. Here, Vega alleges he “engaged in protected activity” on “January 18, 2023” by informing “Mr. Barnes of his disability.” Amurcon fired Vega on “January 27, 2024.” This ten-day gap is sufficient to allege causation through temporal proximity.

Wrongful discharge

In Count Three, Vega raises a wrongful discharge claim under the ADA. Amurcon asks the court to dismiss Count Three as it is “the same cause of action” as Count One. The court disagrees.

Vega alleges he “was able to perform the essential functions of the job” and that he “was meeting or exceeding Amurcon’s legitimate business expectations” because he received “two (2) excellent work ratings” from a cell phone applicaton. Therefore, the question of whether Vega met Amurcon’s legitimate expectations is not an issue in this case.

According to Vega, Amurcon’s reason for terminating Vega changed from budget concerns, which were later demonstrated to be false, to performance issues. Due to these changing reasons, as well as Vega’s replacement with a different temp employee, “no rational trier of fact could conclude” that his termination does not “raise[s] a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” As such, Vega pleads sufficient facts to establish the fourth element of Count Three.

Count Four

Amurcon argues cat’s paw liability “is not an independent cause of action” and therefore must be dismissed. The court agrees. Further, even if Vega alleged a cognizable cause of action, his alleged facts do not support a finding of cat’s paw liability.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.

Vega v. Amurcon Realty Company, Case No. 6:24-cv-00020, Nov. 6, 2025. WDVA at Lynchburg (Moon). VLW 025-3-461. 12 pp.