Employment: Ex-public defender loses appeal in sexual harassment case

Where a former federal public defender alleged her supervisor and other court personnel were deliberately indifferent to her claims of sexual harassment by her supervisor, and that the employee dispute resolution process was fundamentally unfair, her arguments were rejected.

Background

Caryn Devins Strickland is an attorney who formerly worked at the Federal Public Defender’s Office, or FDO, for the Western District of North Carolina. She alleges that her supervisor (J.P. Davis) sexually harassed her, following which the response of both the Fourth Circuit and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts purportedly violated her due-process and equal-protection rights.

The district court ruled in favor of the government on all of Strickland’s claims after a bench trial. Strickland now appeals that ruling, as well as the district court’s previous summary-judgment ruling in favor of two of the individually named defendants.

Due process

This court previously held Strickland could prevail on her due-process claim if she proved that she was “led to believe” that Anthony Martinez, the FDO unit executive, would be the final decisionmaker on her complaint. The district court found that Strickland genuinely believed that Martinez would be the final decisionmaker, but it determined that this belief was unreasonable. It did not err in so finding.

Strickland further contends that her due-process rights were violated because of the

“fundamental[] unfair[ness]” of the employee dispute resolution, or EDR, process as it was applied to her. This argument does not fit within the coerced-resignation framework. Her argument, moreover, is foreclosed by the structure of the EDR plan.

All of the procedural errors about which Strickland complains happened before the hearing procedures commenced. To rule in Strickland’s favor, this court would have to conclude that she was entitled to due-process protection within the investigation and the counseling and mediation stages alone, without regard to the protections in the later stages the proceeding. To the extent that Strickland argues that the later procedures, as applied to her, would have been “patently inadequate,” that argument fails.

Strickland next argues that she was coerced to end the EDR process for a variety of reasons. To prevail, Strickland was required to show that the government’s conduct “effectively deprived [her] of free choice in the matter.” To the extent that Strickland believed that errors in the EDR process deprived her of a real chance to “stand pat and fight,” this belief was unreasonable. Nor has Smith shown “a calculated effort to pressure” her into dropping her complaint “through the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions.”

Equal protection

At trial, the court rejected Strickland’s arguments that Martinez violated her equal-protection rights by responding to her good-faith complaint with deliberate indifference, and by subjecting her to a mixture of retaliation and continued sexual harassment. And at summary judgment, the court rejected her argument that Fourth Circuit Executive James Ishida and Chief Judge Gregory were deliberately indifferent to her sexual-harassment complaint.

None of the actions by Martinez or the others mentioned by Strickland undermined the reasonable, concrete steps that Martinez took to protect Strickland from the alleged harassment. The district court accordingly did not err in concluding that Strickland failed to meet her burden on the third prong of the deliberate-indifference test.

Strickland also argues that Martinez retaliated and discriminated against her for raising sexual-harassment allegations. At trial, Strickland raised a litany of allegedly retaliatory incidents. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that none of them were in fact retaliatory or motivated by gender-based discrimination.

The record lacks evidence to support the third and fourth prongs of Strickland’s equal-protection claim against Ishida—deliberate inaction or a cover-up and an intent to treat Strickland worse because of her sex. And while Strickland asks the court to infer discriminatory intent from Chief Judge Gregory’s decision not to disqualify Martinez from the investigative process, and from his “hands-off” approach to the investigation itself, she failed to present any evidence from which such a conclusion could reasonably be drawn.

‘Me Too’ evidence

Strickland refused to consider 77 pages of materials that Strickland refers to as the “Me Too” evidence, consisting of detailed accusations of gender-based discrimination or harassment by Martinez, Davis and others at the FDO; accusations of retaliation by Martinez or both types of accusations. The court finds that any error was harmless.

Unsealing

Strickland moves to publicly file an unredacted version of her opening brief and a version of the Me Too evidence that contains some redactions. Strickland correctly points out that this case raises novel theories and that the government is itself effectively the defendant. But those factors do not outweigh the significant privacy interests of the government-employee complainants, as well as innocent third parties, that would be eviscerated by an order unsealing their complaints.

Summary reversal

Before briefing had begun, Strickland filed a motion arguing that the district court abused its discretion by permitting pro bono counsel to withdraw from representation and that the error warranted immediate reversal. Because no reversible error occurred, the motion for summary reversal is denied.

Affirmed. Motions to unseal and for summary reversal denied.

Strickland v. Moritz, Case No. 24-205, Aug. 15, 2025. 4th Cir. (Gilman), from WDNC at Asheville (Young). Caryn Devins Strickland for Appellant. Kevin B. Soter for Appellees. VLW 025-2-332. 51 pp.