Consumer Protection – Unfair/fraudulent debt collection suit was wrongly dismissed

Where the district court granted summary judgment to a mortgage lender, reasoning that the consumers failed to show it intentionally utilized fraudulent or unfair debt collection practices, it erred. The relevant statutory provisions do not require any intent to violate on the part of the alleged violator.

Background

Gary and Lisa Tederick — individually and on behalf of others similarly situated — challenge the district court’s February 2025 award of summary judgment to defendant LoanCare LLC. The district court concluded that the Tedericks had failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LoanCare had intentionally utilized fraudulent or unfair debt collection practices.

Statutory analysis

With strong support from the Attorney General of West Virginia, the Tedericks assert that the memorandum opinion incorrectly ruled that the at-issue statutory provisions each required proof of an intentional violation thereof by LoanCare. The court agrees.

By their plain and unambiguous language, the at-issue statutory provisions do not require any intent to violate on the part of the alleged violator (that is, LoanCare). Rather, the at-issue statutory provisions of the Act simply require proof of a violation thereof, either intentionally or unintentionally — i.e., they are for “strict liability.”

Even if some ambiguity exists concerning the at-issue statutory provisions, the result would yet be the same. The Act is a remedial enactment that must be liberally construed to honor the legislature’s intent of protecting consumers in West Virginia. The legislative history of the Act readily supports the conclusion that the at-issue statutory provisions do not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that an alleged violator (i.e., LoanCare) acted with intent to violate those provisions.

Rather, those provisions are for “strict liability,” and they require no proof of an intent to violate. To reach a different result would not only undermine the broad remedial purpose of the Act, and it would put West Virginia’s consumers — like the Tedericks — at an extreme and unfair disadvantage.

Alternative arguments

Despite previously urging the district court in the underlying proceedings to read such an “intent” requirement into the at-issue statutory provisions of the Act, LoanCare — rather surprisingly — now throws the district judge “under the bus,” taking a different approach on appeal.

The court treats LoanCare’s appellate position — i.e., that it is neither defending nor taking a position on the district court’s ruling that the at-issue statutory provisions each require a showing of intent in order to prove a violation thereof — as an abandonment of the issue. Specifically, LoanCare — as the appellee — has abandoned its argument to the district court that the at-issue statutory provisions do, in fact, require a showing of an intent to violate.

LoanCare now maintains that this court should affirm the judgment on two alternative grounds: (1) since LoanCare correctly applied the Tedericks’ prepayments, there was no improper interest charged on the Loan or (2) LoanCare is entitled to the protections afforded by the “bona fide error” defense.

LoanCare is correct that a panel of this court is permitted to “affirm [a district court’s judgment] on any ground appearing in the record.” In this situation, however, neither of the “alternative grounds” advanced by LoanCare are at all “apparent.” As to LoanCare’s first affirmance contention, despite LoanCare’s insistence that it correctly calculated the Tedericks’ interest on the Loan, that issue is not at all clear. Indeed, the district court specifically recognized that LoanCare may have misapplied the Tedericks’ prepayments and collected interest that was not otherwise owed on the Loan.

As to LoanCare’s second contention, LoanCare did not even move for summary judgment on that ground, raising the issue only in its reply brief in the underlying proceedings in the district court. Generally, this court does not consider such tardily-interposed arguments on appeal. Separate and apart from that waiver issue, it is not at all clear that LoanCare would prevail — at the summary judgment stage — on such an affirmative defense.

Vacated and remanded.

Tederick v. LoanCare LLC, Case No. 25-1315, Feb. 23, 2026. 4th Cir. (King), from EDVA at Norfolk (Jackson). Anthony J. Majestro for appellants. Bryan Michael Killian for appellee. VLW 026-2-057. 35 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-057
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