Tort – Court refuses to reinstate previously dismissed claims

Where the plaintiff argued the court should reinstate previously-dismissed claims based upon information uncovered during discovery, but he failed to show that he acted in a timely manner, that his claims were meritorious or that this was an exceptional circumstance warranting Rule 60 relief, and reinstating his claims would cause the defendants to suffer unfair prejudice, his motion was denied.

Background

Martin J. Misjuns, a former fire captain and paramedic for the City of Lynchburg, sued the Lynchburg Fire Department; the City of Lynchburg and thee individual defendants, asserting multiple claims.

On April 20, 2023, the court issued an order that allowed only the First Amendment claims against the City of Lynchburg to proceed. The case then progressed through discovery. On July 17, 2024, the court dismissed the remaining First Amendment claims because no form of relief could be granted when the court had already determined that Misjuns failed to sufficiently plead a Monell claim against the City.

On June 5, 2025, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court’s dismissal. Misjuns now seeks to reopen the case, set aside the judgment and amend the complaint. Misjuns contends that several depositions revealed newly discovered evidence supporting both his Monell claim and his equal protection claim.

Standard

A plaintiff must satisfy four threshold requirements to establish relief under Rule 60(b)(2): timeliness, a meritorious claim, lack of unfair prejudice and exceptional circumstances. Misjuns fails to meet any of the four.

Timeliness

First, Misjuns discovered the new evidence in April 2024 but waited until July 2025 to file this motion When Misjuns discovered the relevant evidence in April 2024, his case remained pending in this court, which retained jurisdiction to reconsider that order “at any time” before entry of final judgment. Misjuns therefore had several options available to him when he discovered the evidence.

He could have filed a motion under Rule 54(b) seeking reconsideration of the April 20, 2023, dismissal order. He could have also filed a motion under Rule 15(a)(2) seeking leave to amend his complaint to incorporate the new evidence. Alternatively, after final judgment was entered on July 17, 2024, he could have filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Lastly, Misjuns could have filed a Rule 60(b) motion while his appeal was pending.

Instead Misjuns did nothing as the case was dismissed and then he appealed. This strategic choice had consequences. It meant that the “new evidence” was neither presented to this court for consideration nor made part of the record on appeal. And critically, it delayed any attempt to present this evidence to a court for over a year after its discovery. Misjuns chose a path that substantially delayed presentation of allegedly critical evidence, and he now bears the burden of explaining why that delay was reasonable.

Misjuns has not met this burden. He wanted the Fourth Circuit to rule favorably on his First Amendment claims while preserving the option to later return to district court with evidence that might resurrect his dismissed claims. This approach is precisely the kind of calculated, deliberate choice that cannot justify Rule 60(b) relief.

Meritorious

Because Misjuns’s new evidence about city manager endorsement reflects the implementation of existing policy rather than establishing new policy, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling precludes success on the merits. And while Misjuns argues that the new evidence shows disparate treatment as compared with another employee (Younger), Misjuns has not established that he and Younger were similarly situated.

Unfair prejudice

Defendants obtained dismissal of most claims in 2023 survived discovery, and successfully defended against an appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Requiring defendants to revisit claims that were dismissed more than two years ago would impose substantial additional costs and burdens. Second, the prejudice defendants face stems from Misjuns’s litigation choices. Third, allowing Misjuns to reopen the case now would undermine the important principle of finality of judgments.

Circumstances

The circumstances here are not exceptional. Discovery of evidence after partial dismissal is not unusual. It occurs regularly when some claims survive a motion to dismiss while others do not, and discovery proceeds on the surviving claims. This is a routine feature of federal litigation, not an exceptional circumstance justifying Rule 60(b) relief. Further, the bifurcated nature of the dismissals, even if complex, do not justify or explain Misjuns’s delay in presenting his new evidence after its discovery.

Rule 60(b)(2)

Even if Misjuns satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 60(b), he must still establish that he qualifies for relief under Rule 60(b)(2). He has not done so.

Plaintiff’s motion for relief of judgment, to reopen case and to permit amendment of complaint denied.

Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg, Case No. 6:21-cv-00025, March 30, 2026. WDVA at Lynchburg (Ballou). VLW 026-3-153. 14 pp.