Employment- Former law enforcement officer’s retaliation suit is dismissed

Where a former law enforcement officer failed to show she suffered an adverse employment action, or any causal connection between her protected activity and her claimed adverse employment actions, her retaliation suit was dismissed.

Background

Colette Cunningham asserts two retaliation claims: under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office, or LCSO, and Sheriff Michael L. Chapman, have filed a motion to dismiss.

Protected activity

Plaintiff participated in protected activities under Title VII when she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or EEOC, and when she filed her prior case in this district. However the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff cannot premise her complaint here on alleged complaints that she made to her supervisors. Those complaints were the subject of the initial disposition of plaintiff’s claims in the prior case.

Adverse employment action

Defendants’ alleged failure to protect plaintiff’s position while she was on Family and Medical Leave Act, or FMLA, leave does not constitute an adverse action under Title VII. This is because “retaliation claims under the various anti-discrimination statutes ‘do not cross-pollinate,’ meaning that a retaliation claim brought pursuant to a specific anti-discrimination statute must be based on a protected activity under that statute.”

The second and third actions alleged – regarding the denials of additional leave and short-term disability – could be “harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” But, here, plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to establish that such conduct qualifies as materially adverse.

The only leave that plaintiff asserts that she was denied was an extension of her FMLA leave, which was denied on Sept. 2, 2021. To begin with, it is unclear why this denial would be considered materially adverse when the FMLA only provides for 12 weeks of leave.

Moreover, although plaintiff alleges that this act was adverse because it “required Cunningham to return to work while she was still being treated for severe PTSD,” plaintiff’s remaining allegations undercut this claim, as plaintiff was not required to return to work. The other adverse actions alleged may have caused frustration or put plaintiff in a “less appealing” position, but none of them are materially adverse.

Causation

Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that plaintiff has alleged a materially adverse action, plaintiff plead no facts that plausibly establish causation or an inference of retaliation.

Although plaintiff asserts that she is relying on temporal proximity, her opposition does not identify any of the relevant dates in this regard. Taking all inferences in favor of plaintiff, the court infers that the EEOC charge was filed in or around March 2021. But the first alleged retaliatory act occurred in September 2021, well outside the range of what the Fourth Circuit considers temporally relevant for purposes of the causation analysis.

Plaintiff argues that “the cumulative nature of the retaliatory actions” establishes temporal proximity. But this argument is conclusory and insufficient to plausibly support plaintiff’s claims, as she does not explain what “cumulative nature” means here. Although the lack of a direct causal connection and temporal proximity does not necessarily preclude plaintiff from establishing a causal link, plaintiff offers no additional allegations to support causation.

Likewise, plaintiff’s attempts to establish causation and/or retaliatory animus by demonstrating that plaintiff was treated differently than other persons fail because: (i) in most cases, plaintiff fails to identify such persons or allege any specific facts in support of her conclusion that they were treated differently and (ii) where plaintiff does identify a comparator, plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that such comparator is similarly situated.

Section 1983

A plaintiff bringing a civil rights action under § 1983 in Virginia must do so within two years from the time her action accrues. The most recent action of defendants complained of by plaintiff was on Feb. 7, 2022. Plaintiff filed her complaint on Sept. 22, 2025, long after the statute of limitations lapsed. As a result, plaintiff’s § 1983 retaliation claim is time-barred.

Amend

Leave to amend Count Two would be futile because it is time-barred but the same cannot be said of Count One. Accordingly, the court will permit plaintiff to amend only Count One.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted.

Cunningham v. Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office, Case No. 1:25-cv-1588, April 8, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 026-3-171. 17 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-171
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