Evidence – Defendant’s attempt to exclude evidence of prior judgments is rejected

Where the defendant attempted to prevent the government from introducing copies of prior judgments at the sentencing phase of his trial, but the judgments were relevant and admissible, his motion was denied.

Background

Johnny Dishman has filed a motion in limine asking the court to bar the government from introducing certified copies of prior judgments at the sentencing phase of his trial. Dishman argues that these judgments constitute hearsay and are not otherwise admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(22), the hearsay exception for prior judgments of felony convictions.

Analysis

The Armed Career Criminal Act prescribes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for a § 922(g)(1) conviction if the defendant “has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another . . .”.

In advance of this trial, the government obtained and provided—to Dishman and the court—certified judgments purportedly memorializing Dishman’s three prior drug-trafficking convictions. The government seeks to introduce these judgments under Fed. R. Evid. 803(22) during the sentencing phase to help prove that these convictions were, in fact, committed by Dishman on three separate occasions.

The parties agree that Dishman’s three prior drug-trafficking convictions are relevant to the ultimate fact of consequence at the sentencing phase of his trial—specifically, whether Dishman is an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). That is, the fact that an individual by the name Johnny Dishman was previously convicted of three drug-trafficking offenses makes it more likely, or probable, that this defendant, who goes by the same name, is an armed career criminal.

But while Dishman concedes that these prior convictions are relevant, he argues that the certified judgments reflecting those convictions constitute hearsay and are not otherwise admissible under the Rule 803(22) hearsay exception. In making this argument, Dishman focuses on the third prong of this exception,3 contending that the government does not seek to admit them “to prove any fact essential to the judgment.”

According to Dishman, the government offers these judgments solely for the purpose of establishing the fact that the three prior offenses occurred on different occasions. Dishman argues that this fact was not essential to any of these prior judgments, individually, and thus, that the judgments themselves are therefore inadmissible under Rule 803(22).

As the government notes in its opposition brief, this argument misses the mark at the threshold because it relies on an overly narrow view of the government’s burden during the sentencing phase. To ultimately prove that Dishman committed three qualifying offenses on separate occasions, the government must first establish that Dishman, in fact, committed each of those prior offenses. A fact essential to each of the certified judgments offered by the government for this threshold purpose is that an individual named “Johnny Dishman” was convicted of those crimes.

In any event, the certified judgments are also admissible under Rule 803(22) to help prove that the defendant committed three serious drug offenses on separate occasions. This is because the offense date listed on each of those prior judgments is unquestionably essential to each judgment, insofar as it ensures that Johnny Dishman would not be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy . . .”. Thus, the date of each offense, as set forth on the face of these judgments, is essential to those judgments because it affords this vital constitutional protection.

Defendant’s motion in limine denied.

United States v. Dishman, Case No. 1:25-cr-00017, April 15, 2026. WDVA at Abingdon (Cullen). VLW 026-3-176. 6 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-176
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