Insufficient evidence of possession in drug case

Even though the police discovered documents and court papers bearing appellant’s name in an apartment bedroom, there was insufficient evidence that appellant constructively possessed marijuana and Xanax that was also found in the bedroom. His possession with intent to distribute convictions are reversed.

Overview

Police executed a search warrant for an apartment on Lakota Drive in Prince William County on July 10, 2017. They found Xanax pills and packaged marijuana in a bedroom. In the bedroom, they also found an identification with appellant’s information but an address in Springfield, Va. The card had expired in 2014.

There was also a Virginia court summons bearing the Springfield address with an offense date of June 8, 2017, about a month before the search. The court date was July 26, about two weeks after the warrant was executed. The police also found a Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services card. The undated card had appellant’s name and birth date on it.

Appellant was not at the apartment when the search warrant was executed but he and others were arrested based on the items discovered during the search.

Appellant was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana and Xanax. At the end of the commonwealth’s case, he moved to strike, arguing the evidence did not show that he was aware of the drugs or that he had ever been to the Lakota Drive apartment. The trial court denied the motion. The court found appellant guilty of both counts. He appealed.

Analysis

“On appeal, appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence, including the presence of his personal documents, was insufficient to prove that he possessed the marijuana and Xanax. … Appellant asserts that there are too many gaps in the evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence established neither his knowledge of the presence of the drugs nor that they were subject to his dominion and control.

“He emphasizes that no fingerprint evidence linked him to the apartment or the contraband; no testimony established that he had ever been to the apartment; no testimony linked him to the marijuana or Xanax, or any of the items in the room, other than his identifying documents; and no statements by him linked him to the apartment or any of the items found there.

“Further, appellant argues that, since he was not present when the search warrant was executed, and there was no testimony establishing his presence at the apartment at any time, the evidence was insufficient to prove his constructive possession of the drugs. …

“Absent a temporal connection, mere occupancy of the location where drugs are found is insufficient to prove constructive possession, even when the evidence suggests that the defendant is lying to the police about his occupancy. … [T]here is no evidence that appellant was in the residence when the police found the marijuana and Xanax.

“Further, … no physical evidence linked appellant to the drugs. The Commonwealth contends that the presence of documents essential to appellant in the bedroom distinguishes the instant case from Garland. Specifically, it argues that appellant would not have casually discarded the summons and the DMAS card, documents critical to his liberty and medical care.

“Assuming that the Commonwealth is correct, however, the evidence does not reveal when the documents were left in the bedroom, whether appellant was the individual who left them there, or, even assuming that he was, whether the drugs were present when he did so.

“The record is devoid of any direct evidence that appellant was ever in the apartment. No testimony establishes that he had been there, and appellant made no statements suggesting that he had visited the residence and was aware of the drugs. …

“The only evidence linking him to the residence was an active summons showing that appellant lived at a Springfield address, an expired identification card bearing the same Springfield address, and an undated DMAS card. Although the presence of these documents may permit a rational inference that appellant had been at the residence at some point in time, they do not prove that he was there simultaneously with the drugs.

“In short, no evidence establishes that appellant was in the bedroom when the drugs were present, that he was aware of their presence, or that they were subject to his dominion and control.”

Reversed and remanded.

McLaurin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1728-19-1, Nov. 4, 2020. CAV (Frank) from Prince William County Cir. Ct. (Hudson) Jeremiah M. Adair for appellant, Maureen E. Mshar for appellee. VLW 020-7-202, 9 pp. Unpublished.