Criminal – District court did not err in refusing to give ‘unconscious bias’ jury instruction

Where a man convicted for making threatening phone calls argued the trial court erred when it refused to give his “unconscious bias” jury instruction, this argument was rejected. The court otherwise instructed the jury on bias, and allowed the defendant’s attorney to make the argument to the jury.

Background

Brandon Hayward appeals his conviction following a jury trial for two counts of knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce a threat to injure the person of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), in connection with threatening phone calls he made to employees of his credit union.

Testimony

Hayward first argues that the district court erred in preventing him from testifying about his mental health, contending that his proffered testimony—that he could not fully recall making the threatening statements because he was severely mentally ill at the time—was relevant to both his mens rea and his credibility.

The government argued before the district court that because Hayward did not pursue an insanity defense, his testimony regarding his mental health was inadmissible under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, or IDRA, and that, even if relevant, his testimony should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because any probative value would be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court granted the government’s motion in limine and issued an order excluding any testimony, evidence or argument regarding Hayward’s mental health history, treatment or diagnoses.

Under the IDRA, evidence of a defendant’s mental impairment may only be admitted when a defendant (1) raises an insanity defense or (2) is attempting to negate the mens rea of a specific intent crime. The “IDRA expressly prohibits the use of any ‘[m]ental disease or defect’ as a defense unless it demonstrates that the defendant ‘was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” However, the IDRA “does not prohibit psychiatric evidence of a mental condition short of insanity when such evidence is offered purely to rebut the government’s evidence of specific intent, although such cases will be rare.”

This court discerns no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude Hayward’s testimony regarding his mental health. Hayward did not pursue an insanity defense, and he conceded before the district court that his testimony was not intended to show that he lacked the intent to commit the offenses.

Hayward nevertheless argues that he should have been permitted to testify that he could not recall making the threatening statements because he was severely mentally ill and unmedicated at the time, and that such testimony would have been relevant to his credibility and whether he possessed the requisite mens rea to threaten anyone. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that any discussion by Hayward of his mental illness or his mental state at the time of the offenses would potentially provide a diminished capacity justification for his actions, which is improper. And although Hayward argues that the district court’s ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to testify, the court’s ruling did not prevent him testifying; it simply precluded his testimony that he could not remember making the threatening statements due to his mental illness.

Jury instruction

Hayward next argues that the district court erred in denying his requested jury instruction regarding unconscious bias. This court likewise discerns no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to give Hayward’s requested jury instruction. Although the court did not mention unconscious bias, the court’s charge to the jury discussed bias, stating: “You must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law before you and must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, sympathy, or biases.”

More importantly, Hayward has made no showing that the district court’s failure to give his requested unconscious bias instruction seriously impaired his ability to conduct his defense. Although the court declined to give Hayward’s requested instruction on unconscious bias, it stated that it would allow counsel to make the argument to the jury. Thus, the absence of a jury instruction on unconscious bias did not impair Hayward’s ability to argue about unconscious bias or present that defense to the jury.

Affirmed.

United States v. Hayward, Case No. 24-4368, Jan. 9, 2026. 4th Cir. (per curiam), from WDVA at Roanoke (Ballou). Mary Maguire and Erin Trodden for Appellant. Zachary T. Lee and Jonathan Jones for Appellee. VLW 026-2-014. 5 pp.