Criminal – District court must consider defendant’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9)

Where the district court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, but subsequent appellate decisions clarified the proper analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the case was remanded so that court can conduct its as-applied analysis anew.

Background

James Jacobs was indicted in 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (g)(9). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that those statutes were (a) facially unconstitutional and (b) unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court, applying the text-and-history test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), held both statutes unconstitutional as applied to Jacobs and so granted his motion to dismiss.

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), which rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) by applying Bruen‘s test to a specific criminal provision for the first time. And, applying both Bruen and Rahimi, this court decided three cases raising different challenges to other provisions of § 922: United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024) (rejecting a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) (categorically rejecting as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1)) and United States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th 224 (4th Cir. 2025) (rejecting a facial challenge to § 922(g)(9)).

Based on these decisions, the government contends that the district court wrongly dismissed Jacobs’ indictment.

Analysis

This appeal ostensibly presents four issues: (1) whether § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional; (2) whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Jacobs; (3) whether § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional and (4) whether § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to Jacobs. The first three issues merit little discussion because, while this appeal was pending, the court answered them in the affirmative.

That just leaves Jacobs’ as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9). This court has yet to squarely address that issue, and for two principal reasons, it declines to resolve
Jacobs’ as-applied challenge here. First the district court’s decision predated several relevant decisions which have clarified the proper analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges post-Bruen. Because the district court did not have the benefit of those decisions—and because its analysis runs contrary to them—vacatur and remand is proper on the § 922(g)(9) charge so that the court can conduct its as-applied analysis anew.

Second, the record developed by the district court is insufficient to determine whether Jacobs’ as-applied challenge has merit. There remain factual questions about: (1) the date and circumstances of Jacobs’ prior domestic violence misdemeanor conviction; (2) the circumstances surrounding his § 922(g)(9) indictment, including the status of any related state-level charges; (3) Jacobs’ conduct during the period between his prior domestic violence misdemeanor and the events that led to his arrest in this case; (4) whether Jacobs sought a pardon or expungement of his prior misdemeanor and (5) any other factor the parties deem relevant to an as-applied challenge under a post- Rahimi inquiry.

Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Jacobs, Case No. 24-4287, Jan. 21, 2026. 4th Cir. (Agee), from NDWVA at Martinsburg (Groh). Kyle Robert Kane for Appellant. Aaron David Moss for Appellee. VLW 026-2-026. 8 pp.