Criminal: Speedy Trial Act dismissal motion in terrorism suit denied

Where a man indicted on terrorism-related charges moved to dismiss the indictment because the government waited several years after his indictment before seeking his extradition, but the government showed it made extensive reasonable efforts, the defendant delayed his extradition and he did not suffer any resulting prejudice, his motion was denied.

Background

On Nov. 16, 2017, Umar Farooq Chaudhry and four others were indicted for conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. These charges arose out of defendants flying to Pakistan for the purpose of going onward to Afghanistan to defend Muslims against American and other foreign troops.

Chaudhry now moves to dismiss the indictment. Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief because the government filed a criminal complaint and obtained an arrest warrant for him on Dec. 23, 2009; however, it waited almost eight years to seek an indictment, and did not formally request his extradition from Pakistan until Aug. 26, 2020.

Standard

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial.” In determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts must balance four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the government’s justification for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Length of delay

Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right attached when the government charged him by complaint in 2009, and as such, there was an 11-year delay in seeking his formal extradition. The government argues that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right did not attach until 2017 when he was indicted. Under either party’s interpretation of when defendant’s Sixth Amendment right attached, the court finds that the government’s delay was uncommonly long. This factor favors defendant.

Government’s justification

The government has explained that the delay in extradition resulted from the defendant’s arrest, conviction and sentence in Pakistan, which began in December 2009 and ended in June 2020. Defendant asserts that because the government did not file a formal extradition request while defendant was incarcerated in Pakistan, the government failed to act with reasonable diligence.

Although other circuits have held that the government must make a diligent, good faith effort to obtain custody of a defendant when he is being held in a foreign country, “there is no case law to support [defendant’s] argument … that absent a formal request for extradition from one government to another, there has been no diligent good faith effort.” Moreover, “the government usually satisfies its diligence obligation if it shows that it attempted extradition informally.”

The uncontested record here shows that the government made extensive reasonable efforts to obtain custody of Chaudhry upon his arrest in Pakistan and continued to make numerous requests to the Pakistani authorities for the speedy extradition or deportation of Chaudhry and his co­defendants. Accordingly, the second factor weighs heavily in favor of the government.

Timeliness

Defendant argues that, because he filed his motion to dismiss the indictment “within the time period set by the Court,” he has timely asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The government argues that the defendant’s assertion of his Sixth Amendment right is tardy because he actively fought extradition to the United States once released from Pakistani custody, thereby delaying his prosecution for a year. Once he arrived in the United States, he knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to a speedy trial. The court agrees with the government. Accordingly, the assertion-of-right factor weighs against defendant’s claim of a speedy-trial violation.

Prejudice

There has been no prejudice to Chaudhry, who pleaded guilty on May 2, 2024, under a plea agreement in which the government agreed to recommend a sentence of time-served followed by a 20-year term of supervised release and to allow Chaudhry to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged violations of his speedy trial right. Moreover, much like his co-defendants, as soon as he appeared in Court, Chaudhry was released on bond, and given that most of his co-defendants were sentenced to time-served, it appears likely that Chaudhry will be subject to the same sentence.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment denied.

United States v. Chaudhry, Case No. 1:17-cv-270, June 5, 2024. EDVA at Alexandria (Brinkema). VLW 024-3-305. 17 pp.