Civil Practice: Pseudonymity denied in alleged erroneous felony drug conviction suit

Where a plaintiff who alleges his consumer report included an erroneous felony drug conviction moved to proceed under a pseudonym, his motion was denied. His speculation of future harm and fear of “retaliatory physical or mental harm” was insufficient to warrant pseudonymity.

Background

Plaintiff brings this putative class action suit against Virginia Eagle Distributing Company LLC, alleging that defendant improperly withdrew plaintiff’s offer of employment after receiving inaccurate information in a consumer report. Specifically, that defendant rescinded its offer based on reports that plaintiff had previously been convicted of felonies for possession of marijuana, distribution and failure to appear.

Plaintiff purports to have never been convicted of a felony. However, plaintiff does have misdemeanor convictions for “possession and failure to appear,” and mentions an expungement in his motion. Plaintiff seeks to proceed under a pseudonym so as not to create a public record linking him to the allegedly erroneous felony drug conviction that appeared in his consumer report.

Analysis

The first factor considers the party’s need to preserve privacy. Here, plaintiff argues that proceeding under a pseudonym is necessary to prevent future economic and reputational harm based on false information. However, many out-of-circuit courts and district courts have found that “[s]uch naked speculation of future harm does not justify pseudonymous litigation.”

Personal information justifying anonymity include “intimate personal matters such as birth control, abortion, homosexuality, or the welfare rights of illegitimate children or abandoned families,” none of which are implicated here. Notably, courts have explicitly rejected plaintiffs’ requests to proceed under pseudonym based on criminal history, erroneous criminal history or expunged criminal history.

Plaintiff further argues that absent his ability to proceed anonymously, he will be forced to choose between prosecuting his “statutory protections provided by the FCRA” and “maintaining the clear judicial record.” Although plaintiff contends that failing to grant his motion would “have a chilling effect on any consumer’s ability to vindicate his rights,” the court agrees with another district court that correctly noted that the “FCRA contains no provision offering claimants the option to proceed pseudonymously,” cutting against plaintiff’s broad argument here.

Moreover, the only link to any alleged felony would be in a context where plaintiff disputes the reliability of such a reference. Thus, the first factor weighs against permitting plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously.

The second factor contemplates whether proceeding without a pseudonym would risk “retaliatory physical or mental harm.” Plaintiff only alleges potential economic or reputational harm, which courts have previously found to be insufficient. Moreover, the court agrees with another district court’s reasoning that “some future employers may deny Plaintiff employment as a result of searching docket entries . . . . [However,] employers that perform background checks would gain access to the factual information in question regardless of whether Plaintiff proceeds under his actual name.” Therefore, this factor also weighs against plaintiff proceeding under a pseudonym.

The next factor—whether the action is against a “governmental or private party”—weighs against plaintiff because the case is against a private party, not a government entity. The final relevant factor considers the degree to which a party’s use of a pseudonym prejudices the other parties to the litigation. Plaintiff’s motion is unopposed, suggesting defendant concedes the issue. And it appears that plaintiff’s use of pseudonym would not prejudice defendant, since defendant is already aware of plaintiff’s identity. In sum, the weight of the factors does not support permitting plaintiff to proceed under pseudonym.

Protective order

Plaintiff seeks, in the alternative, a protective order that would proactively require any filing that references plaintiff’s true identity to be placed under seal. Plaintiff fails to discuss why alternatives, such as redacting documents, are an inadequate remedy in this case. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff seeks to have any reference to his true identity filed under seal, the court declines to do so, for the reasons set forth above.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed under pseudonym or, in the alternative, for a protective order denied.

Doe v. Virginia Eagle Distributing Company LLC, Case No. 3:24-cv-912, July 8, 2025. EDVA at Richmond (Young). VLW 025-3-283. 7 pp.