Criminal – Man sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for shooting at military sites

Where the district court did not abuse its discretion when it resentenced a man who “fired multiple rounds from a 9mm semi-automatic pistol at various military-related sites in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington,” its sentencing decision was affirmed.

Background

In January 2012, Yonathan Melaku agreed to plead guilty to three charges: injuring government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (Count One); using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Two) and attempting to injure a veteran’s memorial on government property in violation of § 1369 (Count Three). The parties “agree[d] that the appropriate sentence” was “a total term of imprisonment of twenty-five (25) years on all three counts.”

After a competency review—during which Melaku was diagnosed with schizophrenia but found competent to stand trial—the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years on Count One, 10 years on Count Two and five years on Count Three.

More than three years after his sentencing, Melaku sought postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After another six years of litigation, this court ruled for Melaku and directed the district court “to vacate [his] conviction under Section 924(c)” (that is, Count 2) “and resentence Melaku on the remaining two charges.”

On remand, the district court ordered an updated presentence investigation report and granted the defense’s request for a psychiatric exam to reassess Melaku’s competency. Following both, it ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence on the remaining two counts and ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for a total of 240 months of imprisonment (crediting, of course, the time Melaku had already served).

Medical compliance

Melaku first argues the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) by imposing a sentence longer than it otherwise would have “to ensure [his] medical compliance.” Because Melaku raised no such objection before the district court, that claim is forfeited, and reviewed only under the plain-error standard set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

To begin, any error must have been plain—that is, “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Here, Melaku has not shown that any violation of § 3582(a) was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” The court thus rejects this claim at this prong, without reaching any other steps of the plain-error analysis.

Everyone agrees that a sentencing court can—indeed, must—consider how best “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” when deciding how long of a sentence to impose. And here, a reasonable reading of the transcript suggests the district court believed there was no way to protect the public without ensuring that Melaku’s schizophrenia remained treated.

Melaku cites no case addressing that sort of intermingled causation, much less one establishing there is an error under the law, when a court imposes “additional incarceration” to “protect the public” from the effects of a defendant’s unmedicated medical condition. Melaku also makes a more global argument, identifying “eight instances” “where the district court clearly indicated that [his] sentence was imposed in order to promote rehabilitation and medical compliance.” This court concludes that none of the cited statements—alone or in combination—reveals a clear or obvious error under the law.

Remaining arguments

Melaku’s remaining challenges fare no better. Melaku argues his “sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to properly consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors, predicated its sentence on clearly erroneous facts, and failed to meaningfully address Mr. Melaku’s nonfrivolous arguments in mitigation.” This court sees no abuse of discretion here.

The district court did not rely on clearly erroneous information in describing Melaku’s conduct as “a form of terrorism.” Having reviewed the district court’s statements in context, this court understands the court to have been describing the “fear” Melaku’s conduct “instilled . . . in the public” when he “fire[d] . . . into these public buildings that are symbols of our military,” rather than suggesting Melaku committed a particular crime or was subject to a particular guidelines enhancement.

The district court also did not rely on “clearly erroneous facts” in concluding that “only some of” Melaku’s “lengthy disciplinary history” in prison was “attributed to his mental health struggles.” The district court also adequately addressed Melaku’s arguments for a time-served sentence. Melaku also is not the “rare” defendant who can show his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Jurisdiction

Finally, Melaku asserts the district court lacked “jurisdiction” to order a pre-release hearing. The argument Melaku raises has nothing to do with the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and it is forfeited (if not waived) to boot.

Affirmed.

United States v. Melaku, Case No. 24-4059, June 17, 2026. 4th Cir. (Heytens), from EDVA at Alexandria (Alston Jr.). Zachary Lee Newland for Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara for Appellee. VLW 026-2-219. 18 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-2-219