Criminal: Child pornography conviction is vacated

Where the district court did not evaluate each element of a three-part test when it concluded that a prison was part of the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the defendant’s conviction was vacated.

Background

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Jesse Perez of producing and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A at the Federal Correctional Institution in Petersburg, Virginia. The district court determined Perez “committed [his offense] in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” because FCI Petersburg is within federal territorial jurisdiction.

Analysis

According to Perez, the government must prove to the factfinder— beyond a reasonable doubt—that FCI Petersburg is within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. According to the government, it must only prove to the factfinder that Perez’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg; the court decides whether FCI Petersburg is within federal territorial jurisdiction as a matter of law.

The government is correct. To be sure, the government must prove to the factfinder that the defendant committed the offense at a particular location. But that location’s jurisdictional status is a legal question for the court. Related to that, the facts underlying that determination are legislative in nature. Thus, a court can judicially notice those facts to inform its legal determination about the jurisdictional status of a particular location.

Even though a location’s jurisdictional status is a question of law for a court, facts underlie that determination. To explain, recall that land falls within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States when (1) the federal government acquires the land; (2) the state consents to federal, or cedes its own, jurisdiction and (3) the federal government accepts jurisdiction.

Resolving these questions requires consideration of facts. And at first blush, one might naturally think all facts should be decided by the factfinder. After all, “[q]uestions of law are to be determined by the court; questions of fact, by the jury.” But recognizing that facts are involved does not necessarily mean that the factfinder must decide them. That’s because there are two kinds of facts—adjudicative and legislative.

Here, no one disputes the fact-conduct question—Perez committed these acts at FCI Petersburg. The legal-status question involves legislative facts—which may be judicially noticed—and questions of law for the court to find and decide. In this case, the legal-status question—whether FCI Petersburg is within federal territorial jurisdiction—turns on an analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).

Here, the district court took judicial notice that the prison was part of the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In doing so, it determined that the federal government has “practical usage and dominion” over FCI Petersburg. But that conclusion mistakenly bypasses § 7(3)’s three-part test for special territorial jurisdiction: (1) federal acquisition of the property; (2) state consent to federal, or cession of its own, jurisdiction and (3) federal acceptance of jurisdiction. The district court failed to evaluate each element. So the current judgment of conviction is vacated and remanded for the district court to assess FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status.

Vacated and remanded.

Concurring opinion

Wynn, J., concurring:

I agree that we should remand this case for the district court to reconsider the legal component of the jurisdictional element and write separately to emphasize that my concurrence hinges on the fact that this matter was tried as a bench trial, not before a jury. I believe that it is only permissible to remand the legal component of a jurisdictional element in a criminal statute when a defendant has elected to forgo trial by jury.

Concurring/dissenting opinion

Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the district court erred in its analysis of FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status, overlooking the statutory standard set out in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) and relying instead on United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973), and concur in that aspect of its opinion. I also support the majority’s decision to remand for the district court to assess, in the first instance, the several hundred pages of new documents the government has produced on appeal. Because the government did not prove facts necessary to satisfy all the elements of the criminal offense with which Perez was charged, Perez’s conviction must be reversed.

            United States v. Perez, Case No. 24-4039, Aug. 12, 2025. 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum), from EDVA at Richmond (Young). Joseph Stephen Camden for Appellant. William Connor Winn for Appellee. VLW 025-2-319. 59 pp.