Criminal: Request to withdraw guilty plea denied

Where the defendant argued the government’s failure to produce a complete copy of the warrant and affidavit influenced him to plead guilty and that its error was thus material, the court disagreed. The record showed the complete warrant would have made it more likely that he pleaded guilty.

Background

David Milam, the leader of the Aryan Kings, a White supremacist group, pleaded guilty on Aug. 13, 2019, to possession of a firearm by a felon. Then, on Jan. 15, 2020, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and heroin and to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. And finally, on June 7, 2023, he pleaded guilty to assaulting persons assisting federal officers in performance of their official duties. In a single sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a downward variant sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment for all three convictions.

Milam sought authorization to withdraw his first two guilty pleas because, as he discovered after pleading guilty, the government’s production of discovery included a copy of the search warrant and supporting affidavit that inadvertently omitted every other page. The district court denied his motion, and he now appeals that ruling. He also contends that, during sentencing, the district court erroneously denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility when the government had agreed to it and had not objected to the recommendation in the presentence report that he receive it. Finally, he argues that his 300-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Plea

A properly conducted Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy creates a “strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” Reflecting this, Rule 11(d)(2)(B) provides specifically that a defendant in Milam’s circumstances must show “a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” And a “fair and just reason” is “one that essentially challenges the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding.”

A plea is not rendered unknowing or involuntary because a defendant “did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision” or “misapprehended the quality of the State’s case.” Moreover, even where a defendant was aware of the direct consequences of his guilty plea, he can still have his plea set aside if he shows that he was improperly “influenced” to plead guilty, i.e., that egregious governmental misconduct was material to his decision to plead guilty.

Milam’s Rule 11 colloquies during both guilty pleas were routine but thorough, and Milam has not challenged them. Nonetheless, he asserts that the government’s failure to produce a complete copy of the warrant and affidavit influenced him to plead guilty and that its error was thus material. This court disagrees.

The record shows that the incomplete warrant affidavit that Milam originally received recounted one instance in which the officers had stopped a vehicle leaving Milam’s residence with drug paraphernalia inside, as well as large amounts of cash, marijuana and packaging materials. The complete warrant affidavit, by contrast, recounted two instances in which officers had stopped vehicles leaving Milam’s residence with drugs or drug paraphernalia.

The complete warrant affidavit thus contained only stronger evidence of probable cause. Stated otherwise, the government’s deficient disclosure understated the evidence of probable cause, thus suggesting that the receipt of the complete warrant affidavit would have made it more likely that Milam would decide to plead guilty. This court also cannot overlook the benefits that Milam hoped to and did receive from pleading guilty in each case. And for this same reason, Milam fails to show that he lacked the close assistance of competent counsel.

Milam now suggests that he could also have filed a motion under Franks to challenge the search warrant as containing false or misleading statements. But how he would have converted this dispute over ambiguous language into a winnable Franks motion is hardly conceivable. Moreover, Milam provided no evidentiary support that he would have been interested in challenging the search warrant affidavit under Franks.

Credit

Milam next contends that the district court erred in entertaining and agreeing with the government’s argument that the district court deny him credit for acceptance of responsibility when the government had earlier agreed in the plea agreement to such a reduction and failed to object when the presentence report reflected that agreement.

There was no unfair surprise in this case, as the record reflects that Milam was on notice that the government would likely contest any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Regardless, the district court had an independent obligation to determine whether Milam was entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Sentencing

Milam’s 300-month sentence, which was 60 months below the bottom of the Guidelines range, was not longer than necessary to effectuate the purposes of sentencing.

Affirmed.

United States v. Milam, Case Nos. 23-4527, 23-4528, 23-4529, Aug. 13, 2025. 4th Cir. (Niemeyer), from EDNC at Wilmington and Greenville (Flanagan). Kelly Margolis Dagger for Appellant. Lucy Partain Brown for Appellee. VLW 025-2-325. 19 pp.