Criminal – Denial of continuance wasn’t abuse of discretion

Where the defendant moved for appointment of new counsel and a continuance on the first day of trial, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied her requests. By all appearances, her goal was to procure a continuance rather than rectify a genuine need for new counsel.

Background

A juvenile and domestic relations, or JDR, court convicted Ashley Freeman of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. She appealed to the circuit court, which denied her motion for the appointment of new counsel on the day of trial.

After the Commonwealth began to put on its evidence, Freeman moved to withdraw her appeal. The circuit court granted that motion and reinstated the JDR court’s sentence of 90 days’ incarceration, all suspended. Before entry of the final order, Freeman filed a “motion to withdraw guilty plea” and asked the circuit court to re-set the matter for trial. The circuit court denied that motion.

Analysis

Freeman argues that the court erred in denying her “motion to withdraw guilty plea” and her motion for the appointment of new counsel. Each argument is meritless. Freeman’s argument that she should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea must fail because Freeman did not enter a guilty plea. Freeman was convicted of the offense in JDR court and appealed that conviction to the circuit court.

Accordingly, as the circuit court observed, Freeman was instead withdrawing her appeal. Freeman cites no authority or mechanism by which she should be allowed to negate her own withdrawal of appeal. Her brief thus fails to satisfy Rule 5A:20(e), which requires stating the “principles of law and authorities” for each assignment of error. “Unsupported assertions of error ‘do not merit appellate consideration.’” Accordingly, Freeman has waived the issue.

Additionally, this court sees no merit to Freeman’s contention that she was entitled to the appointment of new counsel, and an attendant continuance, which she requested on the day of trial. A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights of the Virginia Constitution. “It is well established that this constitutional guarantee entitles indigent criminal defendants to court[-]appointed counsel in . . . criminal cases resulting in a sentence of imprisonment.”

“This constitutional right to counsel, however, does not guarantee that an indigent defendant will receive representation by counsel of [her] own choosing.” Further, “this right is a qualified right [that] is limited by a ‘countervailing state interest . . . in proceeding with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis.’” “[B]road discretion is afforded the trial court in determining whether a continuance to obtain counsel should be granted.” To justify discharging an indigent defendant’s original attorney and appointing new counsel, the defendant must show “good cause.”

Here, Freeman’s request for new court-appointed counsel was devoid of any good cause. Although she claimed inadequate representation by her current counsel, she did not elaborate on the nature of her dissatisfaction. Further, the request came minutes before trial was to begin. By all appearances, Freeman’s goal was to procure a continuance rather than rectify a genuine need for new counsel. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Affirmed.

Freeman v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0411-25-2, May 5, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of Albemarle County (Higgins). (Anthony D. Martin; Lepold & Martin, PLLC., on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin M. Brewster, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-179. 5 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-179

• Freeman v. Commonwealth