Search & Seizure – Warrantless search of vehicle excused by protective sweep exception

Where the defendant argued the police improperly searched his vehicle, after he had been detained and placed in handcuffs, because he did not present a danger to the police while handcuffed, but it was proper to detain him and perform a protective sweep of the vehicle for the officer’s safety, the motion to suppress was denied.

Background

A jury convicted Tyerre Rickelle Robinson of possession of a firearm while illegally possessing a Schedule II controlled substance and with possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell, give or distribute the cocaine.

Search

Robinson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching the vehicle after he had been detained and placed in handcuffs. Robinson alleged that because he and the vehicle were secure there were no exigent circumstances permitting the police to search the vehicle without a warrant. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that given the totality of the circumstances it was proper to detain Robinson and perform a protective sweep of the defendant’s vehicle for the officer’s safety. This court agrees.

The record reflects that Officer Ebel observed Robinson, a convicted felon, enter his car with a firearm at his hip and exit without the gun. When a pat down of Robinson failed to reveal a firearm, the officers “rational[ly] infer[red],” that the firearm was in the vehicle and Robinson would be able to access the weapon upon release.

Other factors further supported the protective sweep. Officer Ebel testified that he was only present at the apartment complex as part of a crime reduction unit in the wake of multiple shootings. And Officer Hines indicated that during the stop, other residents came outside and were “slowly building what appeared to be a scene.” Given the totality of circumstances, Robinson failed to demonstrate that the police lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a protective sweep of his vehicle.

Robinson argues that he could not have represented a danger to the officers at the time of the search because he was “legally detained and not free to leave.” This argument misses the mark. “A vehicle sweep justified by officer safety concerns is permissible if it occurs during an investigatory detention that falls short of an arrest.”

Here, although the police had placed Robinson in handcuffs prior to the sweep of his vehicle, the trial court did not err characterizing the stop as a detention rather than an arrest. Officer Hines informed Robinson that he would only be arrested if the police found contraband in the vehicle. That Robinson complied with police instructions during the stop is irrelevant. The justification for a protective sweep is the officers’ safety once the suspect is released.

In this case, once the stop ended, Robinson would have access to his car and any weapons inside. Thus, the trial court’s decision to deny Robinson’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

Sufficiency

Robinson asserts that the cocaine he possessed was for personal use rather than for distribution. The circuit court did not err in denying his motion to strike.

The Commonwealth presented evidence that Officer McCarthy recovered 17.78 grams of cocaine from Robinson’s car. Detective Winter opined that such a large amount of cocaine is inconsistent with personal use. He also testified that Robinson’s burner phone contained messages consistent with drug sale transactions. One message referenced payment for “a pool” or an eighth of an ounce of cocaine, and another asked Robinson for a “teenager,” or one-sixteenth of an ounce. Based on the admitted evidence, a rational fact finder could conclude that Robinson possessed the requisite intent to distribute.

Affirmed.

Robinson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2141-24-2, May 5, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Ortiz). From the Circuit Court of Henrico County (Wallerstein Jr.). John W. Parsons (John W. Parsons, Attorney at Law, on brief), for appellant. Andrew T. Hull, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-184. 9 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-184