Search & Seizure – Police didn’t unreasonably prolong traffic stop

Where the police did not unreasonably prolong a traffic stop, the defendant’s motion to suppress was denied.

Background

Lyndrell Hawkins moves to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop he claims was unlawfully prolonged and from a search warrant he asserts was obtained without probable cause and based upon inaccurate information. He also requests disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant referenced in the search warrant affidavit.

Traffic stop

The defendant moves to suppress all evidence obtained from an April 24, 2025 traffic stop because he alleges that the stop was “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission.” The defendant does not argue that the traffic stop was illegitimate at its inception. Therefore, the defendant challenges the stop only under the second Terry prong—if the officer’s actions during the seizure were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop.

The defendant argues that “[i]mmediately upon the traffic stop being made if not before, the police were fully aware that the tags were the proper ones” and at that point, the stop should have ended. Therefore, any actions that occurred after were illegal. The court disagrees.

The investigators stopped the defendant’s vehicle at approximately 12:15 p.m. And no more than 14 minutes later, at approximately 12:29 p.m., a narcotics canine positively alerted. During this time, the investigators also discovered that the female passenger had a warrant for assault and repeatedly asked the defendant to turn off the vehicle and step out after he initially turned the vehicle back on. It is reasonable to the court that the ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop—including running a computer check and interfacing with the defendant—would reasonably take 14 minutes. And so, the 14-minute detention was justified by the ordinary inquiries incident to a routine traffic stop.

But even if the timeline was not justified by the ordinary inquiries, the facts here demonstrate that the investigators had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in possession of contraband: The investigators had previously observed the defendant engage in multiple hand-to-hand transactions, which in the investigators’ experience were consistent with narcotics transactions.

Earlier that same day, the investigators observed the defendant leave the Hyatt Place with multiple bags, drive to an apartment complex, and engage in a hand-to-hand transaction indicative of a drug transaction. Therefore, the investigators had reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity sufficient to authorize any potential delay of the defendant’s detention prior to the narcotics canine’s positive alert.

Search warrant

The defendant also moves to suppress evidence seized on April 24, 2025, from room 230 of the Hyatt Place because the search warrant lacked probable cause, contained inaccurate information, and/or was based on information obtained in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. This request is denied. The court is satisfied that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed based on the totality of the circumstances detailed in the affidavit, irrespective of the informant’s reliability.

Second, the defendant alleges that the search warrant “contains inaccurate and/or inconsistent information” because it “sets forth that the information was sworn to on April 22, 2025, which is prior to the dates in the search warrant.” However, this argument, untethered to the applicable legal framework under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), fails because it is quite clear that the April 22, 2025, date is a scrivener’s error that does not invalidate the warrant.

Finally, the defendant argues that the hotel registry search, Hyatt Place management’s disclosure of the room that the defendant was staying in and the subsequent dog sniff outside of that room violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests because the police did not have a warrant to obtain hotel records and the defendant did not consent to such information being revealed.

But the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel’s guest registration records. Additionally, it is well established that a dog sniff is not a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and so the dog sniff outside of room 230 could not have violated any purported privacy interest of the defendant.

Informant

The defendant seeks disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity “so the defense can adequately and fully investigate the facts that the search warrant is based upon.” Because the defendant does not articulate any reason for needing to obtain the identity of the confidential informant beyond challenging the validity of the search warrant, the request will be denied.

Defendant’s motion to suppress denied.

United States v. Hawkins, Case No. 4:25-cr-75, May 28, 2026. EDVA at Newport News (Walker). VLW 026-3-230. 13 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-230