Virginia Lawyers Weekly//June 22, 2026//
Virginia Lawyers Weekly//June 22, 2026//
Where an inmate filed two motions for a sentence reduction, but he failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute, his motions were denied.
Background
Raul Magallanes-Flores, proceeding pro se, has filed two motions for a sentence
reduction. In the first motion, he seeks a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), commonly known as a motion for compassionate release. In the second motion, Magallanes-Flores seeks a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)
Magallanes-Flores’s requested relief requires the court to consider (1) if he exhausted his administrative remedies; (2) if so, whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction in his sentence and (3) if so, what, if any, sentence reduction is appropriate after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
First, Magallanes-Flores submitted a request to the warden at the facility where he was being held but received no response. The government does not contest exhaustion and the court finds that Magallanes-Flores satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
Second, Magallanes-Flores claims that if he were sentenced today he would receive a significantly shorter sentence because of “modern sentencing practices and the reduced emphasis on harsh mandatory minimums—especially for non-violent drug offenses[.]” This vague and conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for a sentence reduction.
Magallanes-Flores also cites his efforts at rehabilitation as a ground for a sentence reduction. However, not only did he not submit any evidence regarding rehabilitation, the policy statement provides that rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. As he has failed to present evidence demonstrating an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, the court denies Magallanes-Flores’s first motion.
Section 3582(c)(2)
Section 3582(c)(2) provides that a court may modify a term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) and after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, and if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
Magallanes-Flores seeks a sentence reduction under Amendment 833, which, in relevant part, revised USSG § 2D1.1(a)(5) to amend the mitigating role provisions to refine the drug trafficking guideline in cases where an individual receives an adjustment under §3B1.2. At sentencing, Magallanes-Flores received three status points for his role as a manager or supervisor in the drug distribution conspiracy. He argues that under the revision to the guidelines he is entitled to a sentence reduction because his role in the conspiracy was overstated.
Magallanes-Flores’s claim fails for two reasons. First, Amendment 833 is not listed at USSG § 1B1.10(d), meaning that it was not made retroactive and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Second, even if the revision were made retroactive, Magallanes-Flores would not be entitled to a finding that he was performing a low-level trafficking function.
Nothing in the record supports Magallanes-Flores’s contention that he was a “low-level” participant in the conspiracy or entitled to a decrease in his total offense level based on his relative culpability. Therefore, even if Amendment 833 were applied retroactively, the adjustment for low-level traffickers would not be applicable to Magallanes-Flores. Accordingly, his motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is denied.
Defendant’s motions for sentence reduction denied.
United States v. Magallanes-Flores, Case No. 4:12-cr-00025, June 9, 2026. WDVA at Danville (Urbanski). VLW 026-3-250. 9 pp.
Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-250