Criminal: Divided appellate court affirms denial of compassionate release motion

Where the defendant argued that the district court did not adequately explain why it denied his motion for compassionate release, but the record showed otherwise, the district court’s order was affirmed.

Background

Larry Antonio Burleigh argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for compassionate release by inadequately explaining its reasoning and by misapplying this court’s law.

First Step

Burleigh contends that the district court disregarded the distinction between § 924(c) sentences before and after the First Step Act, neglected the length of his sentence and never addressed why the disparity between his old and potentially new sentences should not be corrected.

The plain language of the district court’s order contradicts Burleigh’s argument. By its express terms, the district court considered, and simply did not find compelling, Burleigh’s argument that his pre-First Step Act sentence was lengthy and grossly disparate from the sentence he would receive if sentenced today.

Far from ignoring the distinction between § 924(c) sentences before and after the First Step Act and the length of Burleigh’s sentence, the district court addressed those issues head on. It considered the length of Burleigh’s sentence. It noted that the sentence for the § 924(c) counts was 420 months. The court also explicitly recognized that Burleigh’s sentence would be lower if he were sentenced today.

And it explained why it felt the sentence disparity in Burleigh’s case did not warrant compassionate release. From the district court’s standpoint, compassionate release was not appropriate in Burleigh’s case because of the seriousness of his crime, its impact on D.O. and his wife and Burleigh’s criminal history—namely that he committed the offense of conviction while “on supervised probation for other serious offenses.”

The “touchstone” is “whether the district court set forth enough to satisfy our court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority, so as to allow for meaningful appellate review.” Satisfying that touchstone is not difficult. A district court can consider an argument without setting forth its reasoning in detail on the record. And a district court need not address every single argument made by a defendant so long as this court is able to engage in meaningful appellate review considering what the district court chose to say.

Further, when a district court denies a motion and states its rationale, implicit within its explanation is the fact that arguments or factors it does not address or addresses only briefly were not persuasive to it. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Burleigh had not met his burden of showing extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a sentence reduction.

Analysis

Burleigh and the dissent next argue that the district court failed to consider his sentence disparity, age and rehabilitation together. Even assuming the district court had to consider these arguments collectively, rather than simply finding each argument separately insufficient, it did so.

At the outset of its extraordinary and compelling reasons analysis, the district court said: “Defendant argues that “his exemplary and self-motivated rehabilitation,” his young age at the time of the offense, and the fact that “stacked” § 924(c) convictions make up a large portion of his sentence constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons when assessed altogether. . . . For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that these circumstances do not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction.”

What else could “when assessed altogether” mean other than the court recognized Burleigh was arguing that his rehabilitation, age and sentence disparity should be considered collectively? And after identifying that argument, what else could “these circumstances” mean other than it was rejecting their collective effect?

Section 3553(a) factors

Burleigh argues that the district court improperly applied the § 3553(a) factors in “one cursory paragraph” that failed to address the disparity between his current sentence and what his sentence would be after the First Step Act as well as his extensive post-sentencing rehabilitation.

Like his other challenges, Burleigh’s § 3553(a) arguments are inaccurate. The district court wrote not one paragraph but nearly two pages about the § 3553(a) factors. And its discussion was not cursory. To the contrary, the court explained its reasoning and conclusion thoroughly. Likewise, Burleigh’s argument that the district court did not properly address his unwarranted sentence disparity in its § 3553(a) analysis similarly fails.

Affirmed.

Dissenting opinion

Gregory, J., dissenting:

The question before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Burleigh’s motion for compassionate release. I would find that the district court abused its discretion in at least three ways. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

United States v. Burleigh, Case No. 23-6254, July 31, 2025. 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum), from EDVA at Richmond (Hudson). Donald Russell Pender for Appellant. Vetan Kapoor for Appellee. VLW 025-2-297. 37 pp.