Death penalty defendant fails to show ineffective assistance

Where a detainee sentenced to death alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his decision to plead guilty and the process of sentencing explaining, but his arguments were procedurally defaulted or without merit, his claims were rejected.

Background

In this death penalty case, Mikal Mahdi appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas relief and his accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. This court granted a certificate of appealability on five issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mahdi’s supplemental expert funding request; (2) the jury sentencing claim; (3) the mitigation evidence claim; (4) the judicial sentencing claim and (5) the guilty plea claim.

Expert

Mahdi argues the district court applied an overly demanding legal standard in denying his ex parte emergency motion to amend the expert witness budget to facilitate further investigation into a possible mitigation claim related to race-based trauma. However, the district court could not have abused its discretion by denying a motion for supplemental funding that, on its face, was premised entirely on “recently discovered evidence” that was already developed and presented to the state post-conviction relief, or PCR, court.

But even looking past this disqualifying defect, the district court determined the services were not “reasonably necessary” because they were cumulative, unlikely to generate additional useful and admissible evidence and lacked merit. That determination was not an abuse of discretion, and it negates Mahdi’s main contention that the court failed to consider his funding request.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Mahdi first contends the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel were not ineffective for purportedly failing to explain the general proposition that “jury sentencing may actually result in a life sentence, while on the same facts and arguments judge sentencing may result in a death sentence.” He maintains the district court’s conclusion that this claim was “directly contradicted by the record” improperly interpreted the facts in a “light most favorable to” the state rather than to him as the non-moving party. The court finds Mahdi’s argument without merit.

Next, Mahdi argues the district court erred in denying relief on his mitigation evidence claim for two reasons. First, he alleges the court “improperly concluded that [he] procedurally defaulted on all but one of his mitigation [sub]claims”—that trial counsel were deficient for failing to call non-family lay witnesses to testify on his behalf. Second, Mahdi maintains the court erred in finding the PCR court’s rejection of his non-procedurally barred subclaim concerning non-family lay witnesses was an objectively reasonable application of Strickland. The court rejects both arguments.

Mahdi’s third IAC claim contends the district court erred in rejecting his argument that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s sentencing in light of three Supreme Court decisions. In response, the state argues that Mahdi has procedurally defaulted this claim. Mahdi responds that, if this court determines the claim to be procedurally barred, it should remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he can clear the necessary hurdles to merit review. However, he cites no controlling precedent to support this approach. And he failed to provide any argument in his reply brief addressing the state’s invocation of the procedural bar. Even if the court reached the merits of Mahdi’s argument, it discerns no error in the district court’s rejection of it.

Turning to Mahdi’s final IAC claim, he maintains that trial counsel were ineffective by “actively advising [him] that his guilty plea would be considered [a] mitigating [factor] at his judge sentencing.” In response, the state asserts that Mahdi procedurally defaulted this claim. The court agrees.

Affirmed.

Dissenting opinion

Gregory, C.J., dissenting:

I believe the district court unquestionably applied the wrong legal standard to Mahdi’s request for additional funding to hire an expert in race-based trauma. I would therefore vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this subclaim.

I would also vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Mahdi’s abuse subclaim and remand for an evidentiary hearing. New evidence of the physical abuse Mahdi suffered as a child fundamentally alters his failure-to-investigate claim, and genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Martinez excuses the procedural default that resulted from Mahdi’s failure to raise this subclaim earlier.

Mahdi v. Stirling, Case No. 19-3, Dec. 20, 2021. 4th Cir. (Agee), from DSC at Anderson (Cain). Ernest Charles Grose Jr. for Appellant. Melody Jane Brown for Appellees. VLW 021-2-351. 133 pp.