Male employee said sex bias played role in firing

Where a company executive allegedly told a male employee that it was easier to terminate him than contend with his female coworker who accused him of sex harassment, the employer’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

Background

Robert Whitley worked for SecTek Inc. from 2006 until his termination in 2018, following an investigation into his conduct after a complaint was made by a coworker. He filed suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sex-based discrimination, alleging that “[b]y firing [him] because it was easier to fire a man wrongfully accused of sex harassment than contend with a female employee who had so accused him, [defendant] discriminated against [him] on the basis of his sex.” Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment.

Analysis

Defendant argues that plaintiff relies entirely on two alleged statements of Mr. Blood and Mr. Daniels regarding the company’s interest in not contending with a sexual harassment lawsuit from a woman. Defendant emphasizes that both Mr. Blood and Mr. Daniels deny ever making these statements. Moreover, defendant maintains that these statements are not material to the dispute because plaintiff cannot present any evidence that Mr. Blood or Mr. Daniels were involved in the company’s decision to terminate plaintiff.

From the evidence presented by plaintiff, there is a dispute as to the material fact of whether Mr. Blood was a decisionmaker in any capacity in the leadup to plaintiff’s termination. As such, Mr. Blood’s alleged statement may “reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude” of the company and “bear directly on the contested employment decision” involving plaintiff.

The same can also be said of Mr. Daniels. Although contested by Mr. Daniels, plaintiff claims that Mr. Daniels told him he could send an email to Mr. Blood appealing the decision and that once Mr. Blood received that appeal, Mr. Daniels would recommend to Mr. Blood that plaintiff not be fired to avoid a “strong wrongful termination lawsuit against [the company].” Not only does this alleged, albeit contested, exchange suggest there is a dispute as to whether Mr. Blood was the chief decision maker with respect to the complaint against plaintiff, it also evidences that Mr. Daniels played a direct role in that decision-making process.

However, “inadmissible hearsay evidence . . . , as a matter of law, cannot create a factual dispute.” The value of the alleged statements made by Mr. Blood and Mr. Daniels is that they were true; if they were not indicative of their motive, then plaintiff would have no potential direct evidence of sex discrimination. Therefore this court must assess whether the purported statements of Mr. Blood and Mr. Daniels are admissible for this dispute to have any traction at trial.

Plaintiff is seeking to present Mr. Blood’s statement that “[i]t is easier and cheaper to fire a man rather than fight a woman who filed sexual harassment claims. Just look at the news[,]” for the truth of the matter asserted. This court finds that such a statement is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).

Plaintiff also seeks to raise Mr. Daniels’ alleged statement that “it was better for the company to fire [plaintiff] than contend with a female employee claiming sex harassment” for the truth of the matter in order to establish another basis for a genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff can show sex-based discriminatory pretext on the part of defendant. The court finds this statement inadmissible.

Notwithstanding the hearsay problem attached to Mr. Daniels’ statement, the contested direct evidence of Mr. Blood’s alleged statements proffered by plaintiff creates a dispute of material fact for which a jury is best suited to evaluate.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment denied.

Whitley v. SecTek Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-01411, March 23, 2022. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 022-3-140. 20 pp.