No legal justification for abducting county employee

There was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of abducting a county employee. Appellant used his vehicle to block the employee from backing out of a driveway. His conduct shows he intended to deprive her of her liberty.

Further, even if the employee was a law officer who searched appellant’s property without a warrant, the sole statutory remedy is a civil suit for compensatory and punitive damages.

Code compliance

Russell is the Charles City County’s community development director and the assistant county administrator. Appellant was previously cited for having too many “inoperable vehicles” in his yard. Russell drove into appellant’s driveway and noted fewer inoperable cars “than there were at the time of the violation.”

She drove to her next site down the street. She pulled into the driveway there. Appellant tapped on her window. Appellant wanted to know what Russell was doing in his driveway a few minutes earlier.

Russell gave him her business card and told him to call her at the office. Appellant was irritated. He cursed Russell and said they were going to discuss that matter “right now.” Russell told appellant she would not do that because he was upset.

Russell attempted to back out of the driveway but appellant’s car was blocking her exit. She asked appellant to move it. He refused and again demanded that Russell tell him why she was at his house.

Russell testified that she felt her freedom was curtailed, that she became very anxious and had a rapid heart rate.

Russell said if he did not move his car she would call the police. Appellant said he also would call the police. It took Russell several tries to connect her call because of a poor cell phone signal. When she finally connected, appellant was “‘outside of the car[,] … [was] very agitated and irritable, [and was] flailing his arms.’”

While appellant was on the phone speaking with the police, Russell maneuvered out of the driveway by driving through the grass and a drainage ditch. Russell and appellant waited for the police to arrive.

Before trial, appellant moved to disqualify the county prosecutor’s office because of an alleged financial conflict of interest between Russell and the prosecutor’s office. He noted that Russell worked for the county administrator’s office, which creates the county prosecutor’s budget.

“Russell testified that although she worked in the County Administrator’s office and ‘prepares the Community Development department’s budget for review,’ she had no hand in creating or working on the budget for the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office.”

She also testified that during the incident, she was performing as “the Community Development Director, not the Assistant County Administrator[.]”

The trial court found no conflict. The court also denied his motion to strike, which was premised on the argument that “Code § 19.2-59 provided him a legal justification for detaining Russell.”

The trial court found appellant guilty of abduction. He appealed.

Sufficient evidence

“Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for abduction. His argument primarily rests on two facts: (1) that he did not have any physical contact with Russell during their encounter and (2) that Russell eventually maneuvered around his car.

“A person is guilty of abduction if, ‘by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal justification or excuse, [he or she] seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes another person with the intent to deprive such other person of his personal liberty.’ Code § 18.2-47(A). …

“A rational trier of fact could conclude appellant’s conduct met both elements.

“First, the evidence was sufficient to find appellant committed the actus reus of abduction because he detained Russell.

“A defendant detains his victim by keeping the victim in a specific place ‘through the use of force, intimidation, or deception.’ … The trial court held that appellant detained Russell through use of intimidation rather than force or deception. So does this Court. …

“[A]ppellant was agitated and irritable throughout the conflict, cursing at Russell and even flailing his arms at times. The trial court could have rationally seen appellant’s conduct as imposing psychological pressure on Russell, especially when considering the location where the incident took place: a rural area where there were no neighbors around and the quality of the phone service was poor (indeed, Russell’s phone calls to the police initially kept dropping).”

Although Russell found a way around appellant’s “blockade, … [t]he abduction statute does not contain a temporal requirement, which means a victim can be detained under the statute even if only for the briefest of moments. …

“[A] a rational trier of fact could conclude appellant had the specific intent to deprive Russell of her liberty. …

“After appellant blocked in Russell’s car, he informed Russell that she ‘was going to talk about th[e citation issue] right now’ and that he would not let her leave until the two sorted out the problem. When Russell asked appellant to move his vehicle, appellant refused to do so.

“Additionally, appellant repeatedly said, ‘I got [Russell] blocked in,’ during his 911 call. By appellant’s own language and actions, the trial court could rationally conclude he intended to restrict Russell’s freedom of movement.”

No justification

Appellant had no legal justification to detain Russell. “Even assuming without deciding that Russell was an ‘officer of the law or any other person’ under Code § 19.2-59 [which provides a remedy for warrantless searches], and further assuming without deciding that Russell violated the statute, the statute is nonetheless unavailable to appellant as a legal justification for his abduction of Russell.”

The statute only authorizes a civil suit to seek compensatory and punitive damages.

No conflict

“Appellant did not establish a financial relationship between the prosecutor and Russell, nor did he explain how the outcome of his trial would affect some financial interest the prosecutor held.

“Instead, he merely asserted the existence of a financial relationship between Russell and the prosecutor because the County Administrator’s office drafted the budget for the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office.”

Disqualification

Appellant argues he was denied due process when he was prosecuted for a felony after he turned down a plea agreement to drop the felony if he pleaded to misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

“But appellant failed to preserve this argument for appeal. Although appellant’s counsel asserted the prosecutor was “horribly abusive,” counsel never mentioned “a violation of appellant’s due process rights in this context.”

Affirmed.

Brown v. Commonwealth., Record No. 0598-21-2, May 10, 2022. CAV (Huff). From the Circuit Court of Charles City County (Bondurant). Wayne Orrell for appellant, Matthew J. Beyrau for appellee. VLW 022-7-123, 14 pp.