Employment: Professor sues university for bias, retaliation

Where a Virginia State University professor alleged that she was treated differently and paid less than her male colleagues, and that she was denied a promotion, her discrimination and retaliation claims survived the university’s motion to dismiss.

Background

Dr. Bridgett P. Robertson brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Virginia State University, or VSU, Virginia State University Board of Visitors and multiple individuals, alleging that they discriminated against her on the basis of sex and then retaliated against her for complaining about this treatment. Plaintiff also brings discrimination and retaliation claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, or EPA. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss.

Proper defendants

Plaintiff ignores that “The Visitors of Virginia State University” and VSU do not qualify as two separate entities. Rather, Virginia law provides that “The Visitors of Virginia State University” constitutes the legally defined corporate entity. Accordingly, the court will hereby (1) instruct the clerk to terminate “Virginia State University” from this action and (2) grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint’s caption to restyle “Virginia State University Board of Visitors” “The Visitors of Virginia State University.”

Defendants next contend that plaintiff cannot sue the individual defendants under Title VII because only VSU meets the statutory definition of an “employer.” Plaintiff concedes this issue. Plaintiff also accedes to the dismissal of several of the individual members of the Board of Visitors as defendants, because plaintiff does not plausibly allege that these defendants qualify as “employers” for the EPA claims.

But plaintiff argues that defendants Abdullah, Minnis, Palm, Walton and Edwards all qualify as proper defendants in their individual capacities for the EPA claims because they constitute “employers” of plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The court disagrees. In sum, no individual defendant qualifies as an “employer” for the purpose of plaintiff’s EPA claims.

Disparate treatment

Defendants argue that Count One, plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim, fails to state a factually plausible or legally cognizable disparate treatment claim. The court briefly considers whether the complaint plausibly alleges direct evidence of sex discrimination under Title VII, and concludes that it does not.

Turning to the burden-shifting framework, although plaintiff’s allegations regarding discrete acts that date before Nov. 7, 2020, cannot support her Title VII sex discrimination claim, and while some of her male comparators cannot buttress her Title VII claim, she has presented sufficient factual allegations that raise a right for relief above the speculative level. speculative level. The court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss as to Count One against VSU.

Retaliation

In Counts Two and Four, plaintiff forwards claims for retaliation under Title VII and the EPA. The court finds that the majority of these claims do not survive the motion to dismiss.

However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that her failure in April 2021 to secure the Chair post possessed a causal connection to her communication “[s]oon” after March 16, 2021, to Donald E. Palm III, VSU’s then-Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs, that she wished “to be appointed Interim Chair, just as had been done previously with Dr. Edwards (a Black man) and Mr. Gordon (a White man).” The court thus denies the motion to dismiss these claims.

Sex pay discrimination

The court applies a three-year statute of limitations to plaintiff’s EPA discrimination claim. Because plaintiff filed her complaint on Nov. 15, 2023, she cannot leverage any alleged acts before Nov. 15, 2020, to support Count Three. However, plaintiff presents data from within the three-year window for some of the male comparators, and therefore, as with her Title VII discrimination claim, the statute of limitations does not operate as an absolute bar to Count Three.

Next, while defendants emphasize that some of the male comparators whom the complaint features focus on different coursework, the complaint nonetheless alleges that her department’s faculty members all perform substantially the same activities associated with coursework preparation and instruction. And plaintiff includes comparators with the same or less experience. At this stage, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that at least some of her posited male comparators have occupied jobs that “are substantially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility.”

Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.

Robertson v. Virginia State University, Case No. 3:23-cv-777, Apr. 24, 2024. EDVA at Richmond (Novak). VLW 024-3-253. 46 pp.