Search and Seizure: Motion to suppress license plate reader evidence denied

Where a man lacked both an objective and subjective expectation of privacy in the exterior of his vehicle, his motion to suppress evidence from a license plate reader system was denied.

Background

Kumiko L. Martin Jr. asks the court to suppress evidence that led to his arrest on multiple charges, arguing that the government conducted an unconstitutional search without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He grounds this argument in the facts that the Flock system’s 24-7 operation, 30-day retention period, practice of photographing all vehicles in its vision, and network connectivity with data from Flock cameras in other jurisdictions collectively provide law enforcement with a means to intrude into individuals’ private lives that is prohibited absent a warrant.

Subjective

An assessment of the motions must begin by determining whether Martin has shown that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the exterior of his vehicle and its relevant movements in plain view to any who would look as captured by the Flock cameras. Martin has presented no evidence in the record on his subjective expectation of privacy. As the government notes, Martin does not assert or provide much at all of a factual basis for his subjective expectation of privacy in his vehicle or his movements.

The court sees two possibilities on which Martin might claim a subjective expectation of privacy on these facts. Neither is persuasive. First, it could be that Martin subjectively believed that this surveillance implicated his expectation of privacy in his home. It is quite true that individuals have a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in their homes. This principle extends, in many instances, to the curtilage of the home.

However, the record here does not demonstrate a warrantless intrusion into the home or curtilage of the home. The police did wait outside the apartments to see who would enter the GPS-tracked vehicle, but such wait-and-see surveillance does not implicate expectations of privacy in the home itself.

This leads to the second potential basis for Martin’s claimed subjective expectation of privacy: one while driving his vehicle. However, here too, well­ established precedent forecloses such a possibility. There is simply no expectation of privacy in the exterior of one’s vehicle or while driving it on public thoroughfares. On this record, it cannot be said that Martin has established a subjective expectation of privacy while driving his car on public roads.

Objective

Individuals have an objective expectation of privacy when they can demonstrate that the expectation is one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Courts must decide what exactly is society’s modern understanding of the interests it views deserve “protection from government invasion.” Martin alleges that society has not accepted constant government monitoring and tracking of individuals’ movements that he alleges occurred in this case.

He relies principally on Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), and Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021). Martin argues that these cases adopted a new “balancing test” that considers factors such as the ease, efficiency, expense, duration and retrospective nature of the surveillance technique to decide whether accessing that technology violates one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements. But that is not what the Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit said, and this court declines to accept that proposition here.

Defendant’s motion to suppress denied.

United States v. Martin, Case No. 3:23-cr-150, Oct. 11, 2024. EDVA at Richmond (Payne). VLW 024-3-559. 49 pp.