Real Property: Court construes waterfront access easement

Where neighbors disputed the scope of an easement allowing the use of the waterfront attached to one lot, the circuit court construed the easement.

Background                                                       

This matter arises from a dispute among neighbors who own property in Virginia. The property includes three lots, each with different owners who have enjoyed the use of the waterfront attached to one of the lots. The use of this waterfront property is at the center of the disagreement.

The easements at issue benefit two parcels (B-1 and C) which are owned or occupied by the Tayloes. The easements burden the property of the Kinseys (B-2), the waterfront lot. Following a hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction and a trial on the merits, the trial court granted relief sought by the Kinseys.

Code § 55.1-305

The Tayloes assert that “[t]he General Assembly established a mutual reasonableness standard applicable to all easements in Code § 55.1-305.” The Tayloes maintain that the circuit court’s interpretation of the scope of the easements violated Code § 55.1-305 by its “judicial attenuation of the easement rights benefitting parcels B-1 and C.”

Code § 55.1-305’s language clearly applies to and governs the specific conduct of the parties involved in a given easement, not the interpretation of the scope of an easement. Although there may be a reasonableness standard custom in Virginia caselaw when interpreting the scope of the use of an easement or the apparent conduct of parties regarding an easement, Code § 55.1-305 regulates only the conduct of parties, and not the interpretation of the easement by a court. Thus, Code § 55.1-305 is irrelevant to this analysis.

Deeds

The deeds of easement here grant “a transferable, perpetual easement to use that certain Wharf Facility located on the easternmost portion of the lands of the Grantor.” According to the Tayloes, the meaning of Wharf Facility within the deeds unequivocally refers to the entirety of B-2.

In the absence of any specific definition of the term “Wharf Facility” and in light of the limiting language “easternmost portion,” as well as the physical location of the only man-made improvements on B-2 that were identified in the easement grants, the trial court’s interpretation of the deed language was supported by the evidence.

Easement rights

The Tayloes argue that the circuit court erred by expressly forbidding crabbing and fishing from the Tayloes’ designated pier on the Wharf Facility’s bulkheads. The Tayloes are steadfast in their position that so long as the activity is recreational and does not unreasonably interfere with the Kinseys’ use of the Wharf Facility, the easements allow it. The court disagrees.

The grantors would have specified if the easement created other recreational rights than those listed, including crabbing or fishing from piers. Furthermore, the act of specifying particular use rights in both easements “shows an intent to exclude” the term “use” therein from meaning or referring to any other specific rights or activities, such as those prayed for by the Tayloes. Although the circuit court gratuitously granted the Tayloes’ specific parking spaces to park and turn around on B-2, to which the Kinseys did not object, they are not required by the easements.

The easements granted to B-1 and C are subject to the “covenants and restrictions” contained in their chain of title, and the owners of those parcels are bound by “other covenants, rules and regulations applying to all users of the Wharf Facility as may be promulgated from time to time by Grantor, its successors or assigns.” The circuit court did not err in its ruling, and the Kinseys are entitled to unilaterally promulgate such reasonable rules and regulations, which apply to all users of the Wharf Facility.

Injunction

The circuit court found that Thornton and Kate Tayloe committed civil trespass by going on portions of B-2 that were not included within the Wharf Facility easement. Thornton and Kate were permanently enjoined from going on any portion of B-2 that is outside the limits of the easements and were further ordered to post a $20,000 bond. The court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

Tayloe v. Kinsey, Record No. 2044-23-1, July 15, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (White). From the Circuit Court of Northampton County (Lewis III). Norman A. Thomas (Ralph E. Main, Jr.; Charles M. Lollar; Norman A. Thomas, PLLC; Dygert, Wright, Hobbs & Hernandez, PLC; Lollar Law, PLLC, on briefs), for appellants. Douglas E. Kahle (Zachary A. Handlin; Basnight, Kinser, Leftwich & Nuckolls, P.C., on brief), for appellees. VLW 025-7-183. 27 pp.