Criminal – Felon is convicted for unlawful possession of firearm

Where a witness saw the defendant enter a vehicle, saw the vehicle approach the house, heard a bang and then found a bullet hole in his house and a fired bullet on the floor, there was sufficient evidence to support the possession of a firearm conviction.

Background                              

A jury convicted Ryan Saunders of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, Saunders assigns error to the trial court for denying his motion to strike, contending that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed a firearm.

Analysis

Saunders contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike because the Commonwealth “failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the unidentified person in the vehicle who discharged the weapon might have been someone other than [him].” He supports this contention by pointing to Michael Hopewell’s testimony that he lost sight of the vehicle for nearly 30 seconds, never saw a firearm during the incident and could see only “silhouettes” in the vehicle because it was dark. In sum, Saunders suggests that his conviction rests on “conjecture and speculation.” This court disagrees.

The evidence established that Hopewell intervened in an argument between Saunders and his girlfriend, Schornak, ordering the former to leave the home and locking the door behind him. While returning to his upstairs bedroom, Hopewell heard all four of the tires on Schornak’s vehicle being slashed. From his upstairs bedroom window, Hopewell saw Saunders enter his vehicle and drive away. Hopewell saw no one else enter the vehicle, and Saunders appeared to be the vehicle’s sole occupant.

Hopewell monitored Saunders’s travel through his upstairs windows and briefly lost sight of Saunders’s vehicle only when he moved from one room to another. When Saunders’s vehicle passed by the home, Hopewell saw a flash and simultaneously heard a “blasting noise.” Hopewell subsequently discovered a hole in the exterior of his residence, which had not been there prior to that night, that extended upwards at a 45-degree angle, terminating in his children’s bedroom closet. A fired bullet was discovered on the floor nearby.

The evidence thus reflected that, while driving by, an occupant of Saunders’s truck possessing a firearm shot a bullet into Hopewell’s home. To be sure, Hopewell could not identify the actual shooter—at the time the gun was fired, he could only see “silhouettes.” But other than Hopewell’s use of the plural form of the word “silhouette,” there is no evidence in the record that supports a factual finding that any individual other than Saunders was present in

Saunders’s truck that night. Saunders’s vehicle was parked outside of Hopewell’s home for most of the day. Aided by streetlights and a porch light, Hopewell identified Saunders as he entered his Mercedes truck. He was thus able to conclude that Saunders was the sole occupant of the vehicle.

Hopewell then monitored Saunders’s movements, losing sight of Saunders’s vehicle for no more than 30 seconds as Hopewell traversed the hallway connecting his upstairs bedroom and his children’s bedroom. The jury was entitled to consider the veracity of Hopewell’s testimony.

And even though there may be “‘some evidence to support’ [Saunders’s] hypothesis of innocence,” this court cannot say that the jury was plainly wrong to reject his hypothesis given the dearth of evidence supporting a finding that there was a second occupant of the vehicle and the existence of ample evidence supporting a finding that Saunders was the only occupant of the vehicle.

After considering Saunders’s hypothesis of innocence that someone else shot into Hopewell’s home, the jury rejected it. On this record, this court cannot say that the jury’s rejection was arbitrary or plainly wrong. Considering the circumstances, a rational factfinder could conclude that Saunders discharged a firearm from his vehicle and, in the process, possessed a firearm. Hence, the trial court did not err by denying Saunders’s motion to strike because the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Affirmed.

Saunders v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0030-25-1, April 14, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Atlee Jr.). From the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton (Henderson-Stith). Charles E. Haden for appellant. Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-141. 9 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-141
Virginia Lawyers Weekly