Criminal  – Man convicted of strangling, assaulting and abducting his romantic partner

Where the man detained his former romantic partner through force or intimidation, and separately assaulted her, his convictions were affirmed.

Background                              

Randy Cephus Jones appeals his convictions for strangulation, assault and battery and abduction.

 Expert testimony

Jones challenges the trial court’s rulings allowing Jean Ann Cheek, a forensic nurse examiner, and Linda Ellis-Williams, the coordinator for an organization that provides domestic violence and sexual assault services, to testify about intimate-partner violence.

They agreed that although victims of intimate-partner violence do not necessarily display a “typical response,” the majority never report it to the authorities. When given a hypothetical situation premised on Logan’s testimony, both Cheek and Ellis-Williams testified that even in the presence of a law enforcement officer, a victim of intimate-partner violence may not ask for help.

Jones argues that: (1) the subject of intimate-partner violence did not necessitate expert testimony because it is a matter within the common knowledge and experience of an average juror; (2) their testimony invaded the province of the jury by commenting on the credibility of a witness and (3) their testimony was overly speculative. This court disagrees.

Cheek and Ellis-Williams’s testimony supported the Commonwealth’s theory of the case by offering an explanation as to why Logan complied with Jones’s demands and did not ask a Halifax County deputy for help when he came to Jones’s sister’s house. On this record, it was entirely reasonable for the trial court to determine that this testimony went beyond common knowledge and would help the jury understand the evidence.

Further, neither Cheek nor Ellis-Williams purported to comment on Logan’s credibility or the events at issue. Instead, each witness gave general testimony about common responses to intimate-partner violence and the reasons why a victim might either delay reporting or fail to report abuse at all. Their testimony that a victim may not ask for help even in the presence of a law enforcement officer may have made it more likely that the jury would believe Logan’s account, but testimony with that effect is not the same as testimony opining on credibility.

Third, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the two experts based the descriptions of common responses on data and experience and, as such, they were not speculative. And any concern about the probative value of the testimony was a question of weight rather than admissibility.

 Abduction

Jones contends the evidence was insufficient to support his abduction conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he detained Logan through force or intimidation. This court again disagrees.

When Jones and Logan arrived at the motel, Jones took her car keys and instructed her to go into his motel room. During the ensuing argument, Logan declared her intention to leave. Rather than letting her go, Jones said, “[B]itch, you’re not going anywhere.”

Frightened by Jones’s demeanor, Logan complied with his orders that she remain and remove all of her clothing except her undergarments. Jones then threatened to “get” Logan if she did not answer his questions as to whether she was a prostitute. A reasonable trier of fact could find from this evidence that, before he ever struck her, Jones used intimidation to coerce the vulnerable Logan into remaining at the motel room despite her desire to leave.

Force

Jones alternatively suggests that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the abduction charge because any force or intimidation used to detain Logan was merely incidental to the other offenses. This court again disagrees.

For restraint to be punishable as a separate abduction offense, the detention must be “separate and apart from, and not merely incidental to, the restraint employed in the commission of the other crime.” During the hours Jones kept Logan captive, he repeatedly threatened to hurt or kill her, and he threatened her son. Understandably, Logan feared for her own well-being as well as that of her child. The hours-long detention combined with the repeated threats of harm was considerably more than the minimum necessary to accomplish the strangulation and assault.

Affirmed.

Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1687-24-2, April 14, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Decker). From the Circuit Court of Halifax County (Morrison). Lauren E. Brice, Assistant Public Defender (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant. Aaron J. Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-148. 13 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-148
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