Criminal – Woman ordered to pay victim $4,359.28 for vehicle damage

Where a woman who pleaded guilty to one count of felony destruction of property was ordered to pay the victim restitution of $4,359.28 for damage to her vehicle, the defendant’s attack on this award failed. Although the woman argued the claimed damages were inflated, the victim sufficiently proved the fair market cost of repair by a preponderance of the evidence.

 Background                              

Gloria Ann Fleming pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to one count of felony destruction of property. At the sentencing hearing, the victim testified that Fleming had struck the sunroof and passenger side of the victim’s vehicle with a golf club. The vehicle was 25 years old and the victim had bought it from her sister 4 years earlier for $3,500.

Although the victim attempted to avoid driving in the rain and was able to park in a sheltered location at work, rain sometimes penetrated the damaged sunroof and had caused a foul smell. The Commonwealth adduced a report estimating that repairs would cost $4,359.28. Fleming’s husband, however, testified that he obtained a Kelly Blue Book valuation that the vehicle was worth only $2,000.

Fleming argued that the repair estimate was excessive because it was more than twice the total value of the vehicle. The circuit court responded that “it doesn’t take anything to get [a vehicle repair costing] three ($3,000.00) or four thousand dollars ($4,000.00).” The court emphasized that the victim was not responsible for the damage, which was caused solely by Fleming’s attack.

The circuit court accepted her plea, found her guilty and sentenced her to a term of five years’ incarceration with five years suspended on the condition that she pay the victim restitution of $4,359.28. Fleming asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in fixing the amount of restitution.

 Analysis

As an initial matter, Fleming argues that Code § 19.2-305.2(A) is controlling in the determination of restitution in this case. But Code § 19.2-305.2(A) applies when “return of the property is impractical or impossible.” Here, there is no evidence in the record that this is such a case. On the contrary, the victim testified that she still possessed the damaged vehicle and drove it to and from work. Rather, the circuit court may order restitution for “damages or loss[es] caused by the offense.”

Here, the victim testified that she went to two dealerships for estimates of the cost to repair her car, and she provided the circuit court with the lower of the two estimates—$4,359.28. Thus, the circuit court received evidence of the fair market cost of repair. Fleming contended that this amount was excessive based on her evidence that the fair market replacement value for the car was$2,000.

However, Fleming failed to provide any evidence disputing the victim’s report of the cost to repair other than her evidence of the cost to replace. Thus, the victim sufficiently proved the fair market cost of repair by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, it was within the court’s discretion to order restitution in an amount to repair the car rather than to replace it because the court has “wide latitude” in ordering restitution and the amount of loss caused “may be established by proof of the fair market cost of repair or fair market replacement value.” In addition, the restitution ordered by the circuit court reflects the “damages or loss[es] caused by the offense.”

Fleming argues that the victim failed to mitigate damages by “exposing the vehicle to rain.” However, the victim testified in detail about the efforts she made to avoid exposing the vehicle to the elements. She testified that she planned her commute to and from work around the forecast to avoid rain and that she would go to work early and come home late just to avoid the rain. The victim also testified that she parked her car under a covered area while she was at work.

Affirmed.

Fleming v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1606-24-3, April 14, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of Carroll County (Geisler). (Robert L. Canard; Robert L. Canard, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Melanie D. Edge, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-147. 5 pp.