Education: School officials sued following sexual assault of special needs student

Where a parent alleged that school officials displayed no semblance of diligence or care until after a student assaulted her daughter with special needs, the circuit court wrongly dismissed the gross negligence claim.

Background     

Abigail and Jacqueline Egan alleged that Shannon Hixon and David Ream were liable for gross negligence and willful and wanton conduct in failing to protect Abigail from the sexual assault from another student. The circuit court sustained the demurrers.

Gross negligence

Hixon permitted C.D. to leave the classroom, with the keys to another classroom, unsupervised, and without any effort to account for the other students, including Abigail. Notwithstanding the requirement for close and direct supervision, and the fact that they consisted of a quarter of the students in the classroom, Abigail and C.D. left the classroom, unnoticed by Hixon or Ream.

Although Ream stepped outside of the classroom and glanced down the hall while Abigail and C.D. were absent from the classroom, the Egans allege that he failed to take any further action in locating the students. Considering all these facts as alleged in the amended complaint, the amended complaint sufficiently asserts “an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety of another.”

Further, as alleged, neither Hixon nor Ream displayed any semblance of diligence or care until after the sexual assault had occurred, when Hixon sent Abigail and C.D. back to a supervised setting (but nevertheless still sending Abigail and her assaulter there together) and reported the incident. However, by the time Hixon exhibited any semblance of care, she and Ream had already breached their duty of care.

Therefore, the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded claims of gross negligence against Hixon and Ream. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrers as to the gross negligence claim.

Wanton conduct

The analysis here is similar to the above analysis for gross negligence, with the additional factor of a conscious awareness of the risk. The “actual or constructive consciousness of the danger involved” is that C.D. was at “moderate risk for committing sexual re-offense” and because of this, he required “direct supervision to monitor interactions with other students, particularly females.”

As for Hixon, it is alleged that she gave C.D. the classroom keys to go drop off his assignment materials. However, it is not alleged, nor can it be reasonably inferred, that she instructed or allowed C.D. to take Abigail with him. Further, there are no allegations that Hixon should have been aware that C.D. would try and leave the classroom with Abigail or that Hixon was aware that her actions would result in C.D. being alone with Abigail. The facts pleaded simply do not support a claim for willful and wanton conduct.

As for Ream, although he did glance outside the classroom at one point, this action is insufficient to be acting in “conscious[ ] . . . disregard” or “acting with reckless indifference.” Instead, Ream’s actions, while indifferent, did not rise to the recklessness required for willful and wanton conduct. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrers as to the willful and wanton conduct claim.

Amend

At the hearing on the demurrers, the Egans stated that “depositions did happen [a few days ago]” and, if the circuit court was inclined to rule against them, asked for leave to file a second amended complaint “given the evidence that’s been discovered.” However, the Egans failed to elaborate on what this new evidence was or otherwise proffer or describe any new allegations that would support a viable theory of recovery.

Simply stating that evidence has been discovered, without a proffer or description of what the allegations are, falls short of a showing of good cause. In addition, the circuit court previously granted the Egans leave to amend. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Egans’ request for leave to amend.

Special relationship

In a cross-assignment of error, Hixon argues that the circuit court erred in finding that a special relationship existed between herself and Abigail. The court disagrees. Given the specific facts and unique circumstances of Abigail’s vulnerabilities and C.D.’s risk of sexual re-offense, combined with Hixon’s knowledge of such, that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a special relationship duty of Hixon to protect Abigail from sexual assault by C.D., while they were in her custody.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Egan v. Ream, Record No. 1022-24-3, Aug. 26, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Frucci). From the Circuit Court of Updike County (Updike Jr.). Hannah Bowie (Osterbind Law, PLLC, on briefs), for appellants. Stacy L. Haney (R. Matthew Black; Haney Phinyowattanachip, PLLC, on brief), for appellee David Ream. Matthew J. Schmitt (Jim H. Guynn, Jr.; Guynn Waddell, P.C., on brief), for appellee Shannon Hixon. VLW 025-7-231. 12 pp.