Negligence: Gross negligence claim against sheriff survives dismissal

Where the plaintiff alleged the sheriff of Washington County was grossly negligent when he hired a deputy who later killed two people and kidnapped a young girl, this claim survived the sheriff’s motion to dismiss.

Background

Austin Lee Edwards, a recently hired deputy of the Sheriff of Washington County, Virginia, developed an online relationship with a teenage girl in California who believed him to be a teenaged boy. In November 2022, he drove from Virginia to her home, and posing as a police officer, gained entrance to the residence and murdered her mother and grandparents before abducting the young girl. Edwards eventually killed himself and the girl was rescued.

Jonathan Kastenbaum, the administrator of the estates of the deceased grandparents, Sharon Winek and Mark Winek, has filed similar actions against the sheriff (Andis) and his employee (Smarr), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Virginia law based on allegations that Edwards was insufficiently screened before being hired. Both defendants have filed motions to dismiss.

Official capacity

Andis and Smarr assert that sovereign immunity bars claims against them in their official capacities. The court agrees. Because suits against Virginia sheriffs or their deputies are considered suits against the Commonwealth, any claims against Andis or Smarr in their official capacities must be dismissed.

Negligence

The plaintiff brings claims against Andis and Smarr for negligence, negligent hiring, negligent entrustment and negligence per se. He also brings a claim for negligent retention against Andis only. Andis and Smarr argue that sovereign immunity bars ordinary negligence claims against them. The court agrees.

To determine whether sovereign immunity applies under Virginia law, courts apply a four-factor test. The factors are (1) the nature of the function performed; (2) the extent of the state’s interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control exercised by the state over the employee and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion.

The function performed here is the screening and hiring of a deputy. Although the state has an interest in a qualified sheriff’s office, nothing here indicates that the Commonwealth of Virginia was involved in the hiring process or that other state employees had control over the ultimate hiring decision.

The plaintiff argues that the hiring at issue here was not discretionary because the Sheriff was prohibited from employing Edwards under both Virginia law and non-discretionary   policies. Thus, he claims that sovereign immunity does not shield Andis or Smarr from ordinary negligence claims regarding their decision to hire Edwards. However, though some of the hiring standards at issue are mandatory, the plaintiff  claims still arise out of the hiring decision itself.

Andis

Regarding Andis’ alleged failure to screen, the plaintiff argues that the abuse and murders were “plainly obvious consequences of hiring and failing to supervise Edwards.” However, the connection between Andis’ hiring decision and the acts Edwards undertook is not strong enough to state a § 1983 claim.

While Edwards was certainly not qualified to work as a deputy, the specific decision to hire him was not highly likely to lead specifically to the circumstances of the murders and abduction here. Thus, the strong nexus between the act taken under color of state law and the particular constitutional injury inflicted is not present here. The plaintiff’s allegation of insufficient supervision also fails due to Andis’ lack of knowledge of Edwards’ behavior.

Turning to the claims for gross negligence, grossly negligent entrustment and gross negligence per se, they survive this motion to dismiss. However the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Andis acted willfully and wantonly when hiring Edwards. Finally the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim that Andis is vicariously liable for the acts of Smarr.

Smarr

For many of the same reasons that support the gross negligence claim against Andis, I conclude that he has sufficiently stated a gross negligence claim against Smarr. The absence of care that led to Smarr hiring a deputy struggling with psychiatric issues who had no legal right to a gun could be considered a complete neglect of the safety of others. A reasonable jury could find that hiring and arming someone who has threatened to kill others due to psychiatric problems would indicate to a prudent detective that the person would use his position as a deputy to further threaten, harm or kill others.

Plaintiff has also stated plausible claims for negligence per se and gross negligence per se, but not willful and wanton negligence.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.

Kastenbaum v. Andis, Case Nos. 1:24-cv-00054, 1:24-cv-00055, Sept. 29, 2025. WDVA at Abingdon (Jones). VLW 025-3-409. 28 pp.