Prisons: Supervisors dismissed from inmate’s conditions of confinement suit

Where an inmate failed to plead facts showing two supervisors were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failed to plead facts supporting a claim for supervisory liability, the supervisors were dismissed from the suit.

Background

Dean Blakeney, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Blakeney claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at River North Correctional Center, or RNCC. The case is presently before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by two supervisory officials named as defendants: Harold W. Clarke and D. Anderson.

Official-capacity claims

Blakeney filed suit against Clarke and Anderson in their individual and official capacities. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the State itself.” It is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment “bars suit against state officials in their official capacity for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Additionally, whereas § 1983 “permits suit against ‘every person’ who deprives an individual of his or her rights under color of state law, neither States nor state officials acting in their official capacities constitute ‘persons’ within the meaning of the statute when sued for monetary relief.”

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that allows individuals to seek prospective equitable relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. In his complaint, Blakeney seeks declaratory relief, in addition to monetary damages.

However, the declaratory relief requested by Blakeney—a declaration that the acts and omissions described in the complaint violated his rights—is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. “This is so because the limited exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity created by Ex parte Young . . . . provides only for prospective injunctive relief from a continuing violation of federal law, and not for declaratory relief for a past violation of federal law.” Because Blakeney does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law, his claims against Clarke and Anderson in their official capacities must be dismissed.

Individual-capacity claims

To state a claim against a defendant in his individual or personal capacity, a plaintiff “must affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Blakeney does not allege that Clarke was personally involved in placing him in a dry cell at RNCC or subjecting him to the conditions of confinement described in the complaint. Instead, Blakeney appears to premise his claim against Clarke solely on his supervisory role at the time of the events giving rise to this action.

To establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements. Blakeney’s complaint falls far short of satisfying these elements. There are no factual allegations from which the court could reasonably infer that Clarke knew or should have known that any of his subordinates was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to Blakeney or any other inmate.

Likewise, Blakeney does not plausibly allege that Clarke tacitly authorized the conditions of which he complains or acted with deliberate indifference to a pervasive risk of harm. The mere assertion that Clarke was “legally responsible for the overall operation of the Department and each institution under its jurisdiction,” including RNCC, is insufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983. Consequently, the complaint fails to state a claim against Clarke in his individual capacity.

Blakeney alleges that Anderson was “legally responsible for the operation of RNCC and the welfare of all the inmates in that prison” and that Anderson failed to fulfill those responsibilities during the 23 days that Anderson was confined in a dry cell. In particular, Blakeney alleges that Anderson did not “make his rounds throughout the segregation unit” in which Blakeney was held. Blakeney claims that by failing to do so, Anderson imposed “cruel and unusual punishment with deliberate indifference.”

Even assuming that Blakeney’s allegations are sufficient to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint does not contain any factual allegations from which the court could reasonably infer that Anderson acted with deliberate indifference to Blakeney’s health or safety. At most, the complaint suggests that Anderson acted negligently in failing to conduct rounds in the segregation unit while Blakeney was housed there. Mere negligence, however, is “not enough to show deliberate indifference.”

Clarke and Anderson motion to dismiss granted.

Blakeney v. Clarke, Case No. 7:24-cv-00413, June 25, 2025. WDVA at Roanoke (Urbanski). VLW 025-3-262. 9 pp.