Search and Seizure: Second frisk of defendant was reasonable

Where an officer arriving at the scene of an armed robbery initially frisked the defendant and found no weapons, but witnesses then identified him to a different officer as the individual who brandished the firearm in the store and described the weapon as one with an extended magazine, the second officer’s frisk was reasonable.

Background

Thomas Wesley Hollingsworth appeals his conviction, entered on his conditional plea of guilty, for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a violent felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. The offense occurred when law enforcement found him with a gun in his possession at the scene of a possible armed robbery. Hollingsworth argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress the weapon found on his person, suggesting that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Analysis

When Brooks first frisked Hollingsworth for weapons, the officer had not spoken with the store clerks, who were at the very least third-party eyewitnesses to the brandishing offense. At the time of the initial contact and pat down, therefore, Brooks had limited information.

At the onset, he learned from the police dispatcher that a “dispute with a potential robbery” had occurred at the store. Understandably, this information caused the officers who arrived at the scene to be concerned about weapons. Brooks had general descriptions of two suspects and their silver SUV, but that was all he knew.

Hollingsworth and his companion were the only two people there, and they matched the descriptions given. So Brooks and another officer patted the two men down for weapons. Brooks acknowledged that the initial frisk of Hollingsworth, the one he conducted, was not thorough. Officers Chase and Luu arrived after Brooks had frisked Hollingsworth. Before receiving any new information from the store clerks, Chase honored Hollingsworth’s refusal to be frisked a second time.

But after the store clerks specifically identified Hollingsworth as the individual who brandished the firearm in the store and described the weapon as one with an extended magazine, Chase insisted on patting down Hollingsworth a second time. This second frisk prompted by the added information yielded the firearm almost immediately.

As the circuit court found, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Hollingsworth had a firearm and Brooks’s cursory initial pat down simply failed to locate it. The store clerks confirmed that Hollingsworth actually did brandish a gun, and they described it. In conjunction with the fact that the firearm was still missing, Chase reasonably suspected that Hollingsworth, who was identified as the brandisher, remained armed and presently dangerous at the scene.

To quickly confirm or dispel that suspicion, it was entirely reasonable for Chase to pat Hollingsworth down despite the fact that Brooks had done so before the additional information was revealed. The Fourth Amendment simply did not require Chase to risk either being shot while continuing to investigate the attempted robbery or allowing Hollingsworth to orchestrate an armed escape.

Affirmed.

Hollingsworth v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1083-24-1, Nov. 25, 2025. CAV (Decker). From the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach (Farashahi). Amber Novoa Alvarez Torgerson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. J. Brady Hess, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-337. 11 pp.