Tort: Government dodges suit over servicemember’s suicide

Where the administrator for the estate of a servicemember who died by suicide while working abroad an aircraft carrier sued the federal government for his wrongful death, but the suit would require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters, the claims were dismissed.

Background

Janos Sandor, administrator of his son Xavier Mitchell-Sandor’s estate, seeks to recover damages from the United States and from defense contractor Huntington Ingalls, or HII, after Mr. Mitchell-Sandor died by suicide while working aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them.

Jurisdiction

The plaintiff brings wrongful death tort claims against the government under both the Federal Tort Claims Act, or FTCA, and the Suits in Admiralty Act, or SIAA. However tort claims brought by servicemembers against the government under the FTCA are barred because “[a] suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.”

Tort claims brought by servicemembers against the government under the SIAA are similarly barred. Thus, the “incident to service” test is implicated, and the court must ask whether the plaintiff’s suit “would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking [and would] require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.”

Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, Mr. Mitchell-Sandor “was stationed at the GW,” where he provided security for the carrier and was “required to stand watch” overnight. He “was [ordered] to live on board the GW.” Therefore, his living conditions—which the complaint alleges were the cause of his death—were incident to his orders to serve as security for the GW. Thus, Counts Two and Three allege injuries that occurred “in the course of activity incident to service.” Accordingly, both counts are barred by sovereign immunity.

The plaintiff contends that Mr. Mitchell-Sandor was harmed by the alleged torts when he was “off duty.” The only allegation the plaintiff highlights that appears in the Complaint is that “[i]n order to rest, [Mr. Mitchell-Sandor] slept in his car frequently because he was unable to do so on the GW.” But the alleged harm nevertheless stems from the conditions aboard the GW, where Mr. Mitchell-Sandor was ordered to live.

The plaintiff also argues that “although [Mr. Mitchell-Sandor] died on the GW itself . . . the harm he endured for months leading up to his death occurred off-ship, in places not associated with the GW.” But that harm, too, stemmed from the conditions aboard the GW, where Mr. Mitchell-Sandor was ordered to live.

Lastly, the plaintiff asserts that Mr. Mitchell-Sandor was harmed while “attempting to engage in basic activities of daily living that all humans do,” as opposed to activities related to military service. However, Mr. Mitchell-Sandor was ordered to engage in those basic activities of daily living aboard the GW because of his military service.

HII

To state a negligence claim under Virginia law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a legal duty, a violation of the duty, and consequent damage.” The complaint fails to allege the first element of the negligence claim, because HII had no duty to provide living accommodations for Mr. Mitchell-Sandor apart from the duty imposed by its government contract. HII might have owed Mr. Mitchell-Sandor a contractual duty as an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between HII and the government. However breach of that duty would give rise to a cause of action in contract, not in tort.

The plaintiff also asserts that HII owed a duty of care to Mr. Mitchell-Sandor under a theory of premises liability. He must show that the defendant owned or possessed the property where the alleged harm occurred. Because the facts in the complaint make it plausible that HII possessed the GW, it is similarly plausible that HII may have owed Mr. Mitchell-Sandor a common-law duty.

However Mr. Mitchell-Sandor lived aboard the GW for work, not for his own convenience or for a social purpose, making him an invitee. But it is undisputed that he did so at the direction (or invitation) of the owner of the aircraft carrier, the Navy—not HII. Therefore, the duty falls upon the government, which is immune from suit—not HII.

The plaintiff, lastly, argues that HII “assumed responsibility for providing a safe premises and not creating a dangerous condition on said premises” and, therefore, was “obligated to act with reasonable care in fulfilling this role.” However, any duty that HII assumed to provide a safe premises for Mr. Mitchell-Sandor would have arisen either (1) out of HII’s contractual obligations to the government or (2) out of HII’s status as a possessor of the aircraft carrier. Neither of those sources give rise to a duty in this case.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss granted.

Sandor v. United States, Case No. 4:24-cv-98, Aug. 15, 2025. EDVA at Newport News (Walker). VLW 025-3-333. 16 pp.