Criminal: Man convicted for killing woman after shooting into occupied building

Where the defendant fired his weapon into an occupied building, killing an innocent person, his conviction of felony murder and other charges were affirmed. Although he claimed he acted in self-defense, the jury was entitled to disbelieve this defense.

Background                                                                         

Following a jury trial, Jihad Arlik Ruffin was convicted of felony murder while in the commission of shooting into an occupied building, use of a firearm in commission of murder and maliciously discharging a firearm within an occupied building.

Defense of others

Ruffin asserts that he was acting in defense of another individual, Vermonte Fitzgerald, who was under fire from Trevon Chappelle, thus, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions against him. However, the record supports the jury’s conclusion that Ruffin was not legally justified in discharging his weapon in a crowded, occupied setting.

The jury was able to “witness” the encounter thanks to video footage of the random acts of violence in the “NOLA by Nisha the Plug” store on July 3. Thus, the jury viewing this video, along with Ruffin’s self-serving testimony, could reasonably conclude that Ruffin’s actions were not defensive but instead represented retaliation or escalation, made in a moment of volatility without regard for the lives around him. Even where an initial act of defense may be justified, the law does not excuse a reckless and deadly overreaction, especially in a populated area.

More importantly, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Ruffin and conclude he was “lying to conceal his guilt.” Ruffin’s testimony did not explain his relationship with Fitzgerald, nor how he reasonably believed Fitzgerald faced imminent harm from his “eye contact” with Chappelle. Ruffin testified he and Fitzgerald did not even talk about the events afterwards. Ruffin had the burden of persuading the factfinder that he reasonably acted in defense of Fitzgerald, and he simply failed to carry this burden.

Malice

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to establish malice in support of his conviction under Code § 18.2-279 for discharging a firearm within an occupied building. The court again disagrees.

Ruffin posits that the central question is whether he acted with malice. But the “malicious” intent standard in § 18.2-279, does not refer to the specific “malicious” intent, but rather general intent. Malice is defined as “the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will.” “Malice may be inferred from the ‘deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless, from all the evidence, [there is] reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed.’”

Here, the jury was presented with surveillance video and testimony establishing that Ruffin intentionally drew his loaded firearm before any shots were fired, raised it in the direction of Chappelle, and discharged three rounds in rapid succession. The surrounding conduct reinforces a finding of malice. Ruffin admitted that his firearm was loaded with a bullet in the chamber and that he fired with the specific intention of hitting Chappelle. His gun only ceased firing because it jammed.

Malice can also be inferred from Ruffin’s indifference to the danger his actions posed to innocent bystanders. The shooting occurred in a retail establishment open to the public on a Saturday afternoon, at a mall that law enforcement described as “very active at all times of the day and night.” Indeed, video evidence showed that Jamiriah Washington was walking behind the intended target when she was struck in the head, collapsed and died on the floor.

Further, Ruffin’s conduct after the shooting reflects a consciousness of guilt. Rather than remain on scene or seek medical help for the victim, appellant fled through the store’s back exit with Fitzgerald and Brown, hid in an unknown apartment complex and later claimed he believed the person he shot was the man he was aiming at—not Jamiriah, who died at the scene. These actions undermine any suggestion of accident or legal justification.

Affirmed.

Ruffin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0625-24-2, Dec. 2, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Causey). From the Circuit Court of Henrico County (Harris Jr.). (Kevin Purnell; Kevin D. Purnell, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Kimberly A. Hackbarth, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-343. 10 pp.