Criminal – Record supports sentencing decision

Where the record showed the circuit court weighed mitigating and aggravating factors when it sentenced the defendant, its resulting decision was not an abuse of discretion.

Background

Michael B. Robinson was convicted of possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance and was sentenced to 10 years of incarceration, with seven years and six months suspended. The trial court also found that Robinson violated the conditions of a previously suspended sentence for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense within five years. The court revoked the unserved portion of his DUI sentence—11 months and 10 days—but ordered six months to be served concurrently with his sentence for possessing a controlled substance.

Analysis

Neither the record nor Robinson’s argument reveals an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Robinson had a lengthy criminal record that included several serious and violent felonies. Months after pleading guilty to the underlying DUI, second offense within five years, Robinson yet again drove under the influence of alcohol, leading to his conviction for DUI, third offense within five years.

He also failed to enroll in the Alcohol Safety Action Program following his DUI second conviction, and he was previously discharged from another recovery program for violating its rules. Consequently, the record demonstrates that Robinson repeatedly struggled and failed to comply with the conditions of his suspended sentences.

Although the record contains some evidence that Robinson had been making renewed efforts to maintain his sobriety by participating in the Starfish Program when not incarcerated, the trial court was not required to give that evidence “controlling effect.” Rather, the court had to place all of the evidence “in the context of the entire case.”

And the court was not required to expressly acknowledge and address each of the mitigating and aggravating factors when ruling on the motion. The court rejects Robinson’s argument that the court did not give certain mitigating factors—such as the letters filed in his support and the Starfish Program’s willingness to accept him despite his sex offense—sufficient weight merely because it did not specifically mention them.

Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by emphasizing Robinson’s status as a father. The court reasonably concluded that Robinson’s repeated criminal offenses after his son’s birth belied his expressed desire to be present for his son, and the record does not reveal that the court inappropriately weighed that circumstance.

Finally, Robinson argues that modifying his sentence was, as a matter of law, in the public’s interest. A trial court cannot suspend or modify a sentence unless it makes two findings: (1) that doing so “appears compatible with the public interest” and (2) that “there are circumstances in mitigation of the offense.” In light of this court’s conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion by finding there were not mitigating circumstances meriting a reduction of Robinson’s incarceration period, it does not reach the second question of whether modifying the sentence would have been compatible with the public interest.

Given the circumstances in this case, this court cannot say that no rational jurist would have denied Robinson’s motion to modify his sentence. His lengthy criminal record and unsuccessful history under supervision created significant doubts regarding his ability to complete a lengthy Starfish Program despite his more recent efforts at sobriety. Viewing the record under the proper standard, the trial court appropriately considered the evidence and simply weighed it “as it saw fit.” As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

Robinson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1481-25-2, June 16, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (Johnson). (Tiffany Booker, Deputy Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Craig W. Stallard, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-250. 8 pp.

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