Employment – Virginia court had subject-matter jurisdiction over remote worker’s claims

Where a California-based company argued the Virginia courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the wage claims brought by a Virginia-based remote employee, this argument was rejected. The company confused subject matter jurisdiction with the merits of the employee’s purported rights to statutory relief.

Background

Robert George Vorthman III worked remotely from his residence in Loudoun County for NAG Inc., a California-based company, from June 2013 through December 2017. During the last several months of his employment, Vorthman received partial and late wage payments from NAG. However, he did not receive any payments from mid-September 2017 to the time he resigned in December.

He sued NAG, seeking unpaid wages under Code § 40.1-29, California labor regulations and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, or FLSA. The circuit court entered default judgment against NAG and awarded Vorthman $90,734.73.

Subject-matter jurisdiction

NAG argues that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over any count of Vorthman’s complaint. Finding that NAG has a continuing and fundamental misunderstanding of subject matter jurisdiction, this court disagrees.

NAG mistakes the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction with the merits of Vorthman’s purported rights to statutory relief, as well as the circuit court’s active jurisdiction more broadly. Vorthman’s complaint is a civil claim for the recovery of over $20,000 in unpaid wages from his former employer for work Vorthman did in Virginia. His case falls squarely within the “class of cases” which the circuit courts have jurisdiction over pursuant to Code § 17.1-513.

Nevertheless, NAG argues that Vorthman does not have a right to relief under Code § 40.1-29, the California Labor Code or the FLSA. Therefore, according to NAG, the circuit court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

NAG’s challenges to the counts of Vorthman’s complaint attack the merits of Vorthman’s legal rights of action and the court’s active jurisdiction. However, it does not challenge the circuit court’s power to hear a civil case brought by a Virginia employee seeking more than $100 in unpaid wages, a “class of cases” over which the circuit court clearly has jurisdiction under Code § 17.1-513.

For example, if NAG is correct that Code § 40.1-29 did not give employees a private right of action to sue employers for unpaid wages at the time Vorthman filed his complaint, then the circuit court could dismiss that count of the complaint because Vorthman has no statutory right to pursue that remedy. That would not mean, however, that the circuit court lacked the authority to preside over the case or that any order dismissing the Code § 40.1-29 count would be void.

Procedural due process

NAG also argues that the circuit court violated its procedural due process rights. According to NAG, the trial court failed “to acknowledge or address NAG’s arguments” regarding the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, deprived it of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The record does not demonstrate that the court ignored its claims.

NAG filed a motion to dismiss in which it laid out its subject matter jurisdiction argument in detail. The court held a hearing on the motion where the parties argued the issue extensively. At the close of the hearing, the court stated that it agreed with Vorthman’s position and ruled that it did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

The court then entered a proposed order from Vorthman’s counsel, which denied the motion to dismiss and reiterated that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under Code § 17.1-513. Thus, there is no basis in the record to support NAG’s claim that it was denied an opportunity to be heard regarding its subject matter jurisdiction argument.

Substantive due process

NAG claims that the circuit court deprived it of its property without substantive due process by improperly exercising subject matter jurisdiction. As this court has determined that the circuit court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Vorthman’s case, it need not address this assignment of error.

Affirmed.

NAG, Inc. v. Vorthman III, Record No. 0612-25-4, June 16, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (White). From the Circuit Court of Loudoun County (Fleming Jr.). Karen A. Leiser (Phillip B. Leiser2; The Leiser Law Firm, on briefs), for appellant. Michael Ludwig (Samantha Vanterpool Rucker; The Spiggle Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-249. 7 pp.

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