Negligence: Defendants can’t escape farmworker injury verdict

Where defendants adjudged liable for not preventing the injury of a farmworker argued the evidence did not support a finding that they had the last clear chance to avoid the injuries, but they never directed the district court’s attention to their preferred reading of North Carolina’s approach to the doctrine of last clear chance, they could not raise the argument for the first time on appeal.

Background

Robbie Plyler’s leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin, and the resulting injuries required the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Cox Brothers Farms and Plyler were negligent. However, it found the farm liable because it, and not Plyler, had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury.

Individual defendants

Cox argues that, because four individual defendants were not present at the site of the grain bin on the day of Plyler’s injury, they cannot be held liable, because none of them would have had a last clear chance to prevent Plyler’s injury. The record shows, however, that Cox articulated this physical proximity argument for the first time, if only briefly, in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. This court cannot say the district court erred in denying Cox’s Rule 50(a) motion on a basis that was not presented to the court until after the jury returned its verdict.

Sufficiency

Cox argues that the evidence did not support finding that it had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injuries, and that it therefore could not be found liable for those injuries under Plyler’s negligence theory. However Cox simply never directed the district court’s attention to its preferred reading of North Carolina’s approach to the doctrine of last clear chance, and it therefore raises this argument for the first time on appeal. This court declines to assess the evidence presented at trial against legal theories not presented below.

Cox does not put forth arguments contending that the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict on negligence under the doctrine of last clear chance as charged to the jury. Therefore, the district court’s judgment denying Cox’s Rule 50(b) motion on the doctrine of last clear chance as to all defendants is affirmed.

Bifurcation

Cox moved the district court to bifurcate the trial into a liability phase and a damages phase. The district court found that Cox had not made a showing in favor of bifurcation and noted that providing limiting instructions would “eradicate” the potential of unfair prejudice. Cox focuses on the heightened risk of prejudice on appeal, arguing that the introduction of financial data “raised a real risk that the jury would use information about Defendants’ wealth in an impermissible way in determining liability and compensatory damages.”

The matter of punitive damages was submitted to the jury in this case, and “[a] defendant’s financial position is a proper consideration in assessing punitive damages.” And while the two issues could still be tried separately at the court’s discretion, it also properly recognized the general efficacy of limiting instructions. The district court provided a limiting instruction that this evidence was for use in ascertaining punitive damages, not for determining liability. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cox’s bifurcation motion.

Expert

Cox argues that the court erred by admitting “irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony” from Plyler’s expert witness, Jeffrey Decker. Cox argues that the district court allowed the jury to weigh the relevance and reliability of Decker’s testimony about OSHA regulations and the steel sump door, when those are determinations should have been left to the court. The court disagrees.

Decker, as a farm safety expert, offered testimony which placed Cox’s actions in the context of safety regulations established by a government agency, and the district court properly drew a line instructing the jury not to take the context of those regulations as per se evidence of negligence. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Cox also contends that the district court erred because it permitted Decker to testify that the steel door covering the sump was not a sufficient door because it could “roll open if you step down” onto it. Rule 703 permits an expert to base their opinion upon “facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”

Affirmed.

Plyler v. Cox, Case Nos. 24-1445, 24-1488, July 29, 2025. 4th Cir. (Floyd), from WDNC at Charlotte (Whitney). Christopher P. Raab for Appellants. John Alexander Heroy for Appellees. VLW 025-2-290. 25 pp.