Appeals: Appeal dismissed because claim remains pending in district court

Where the district court dismissed the Title VII and ADA claims because the complaint was filed more than 90 days after the right-to-sue notice was issued, but it did not resolve a motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, the appeal was dismissed.

Background

Phyllis Weaver, a former pharmacist at the Walgreen Company sued Walgreens under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging various race- and disability-based claims. The district court granted Walgreens’ motion to dismiss the Title VII and ADA claims under 12(b)(1), and then denied the 12(b)(6) portion of Walgreens’ motion as moot. The opinion did not address the § 1981 claim; nevertheless, it closed the case.

Analysis

The district court’s discussion engaged solely with the 90-day filing window for Weaver’s Title VII and ADA claims. It concluded that her complaint was untimely because it was filed after that window. But the 90-day filing window does not apply to § 1981 claims, as even Walgreens concedes. Thus, the reasoning that the district court applied in discussing the Title VII and ADA claims could not extend to the § 1981 claim, nor does that reasoning demonstrate that the district court contemplated or intended to dismiss the § 1981 claim.

The district court did not address any “central component” of Weaver’s § 1981 claim. Such discussion was particularly critical here, where Walgreens’ motion to dismiss the Title VII and ADA claims was based on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 12(b)(1), but its motion to dismiss the § 1981 claim was for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

That 12(b)(6) motion required an analysis of the elements, as no jurisdictional argument nor affirmative defense was before the court. Without such an analysis, this court has no understanding of the court’s basis for dismissing the § 1981 claim––or if it even meant to do so––before purportedly closing the case. Thus, it cannot be said that the district court “rul[ed] on” Weaver’s § 1981 claim.

Weaver argues that “[a]lthough . . . the district court . . . never addressed the viability of her Section 1981 claim, the Judgment closed the case,” and therefore “this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.” But this court looks “to substance, not form,” and emphasizes that the “label” on the district court’s order and judgment––in this case, stating that “[t]his case is closed” ––is not dispositive. Accordingly, because the district court did not address Weaver’s § 1981 claim in closing the case, its decision is not final.

Dismissed and remanded.

Weaver v. Walgreen Company, Case No. 23-1763, Apr. 8, 2025. 4th Cir. (Gregory), from EDNC at Raleigh (Boyle). Robert Thomas Vance Jr. for Appellant. Sarah E. Bouchard for Appellee. Anne Noel Occhialino for Amicus Curiae. VLW 025-2-132. 10 pp.